## 2017 UCSF Faculty Salary Equity Review (FSER) Report

## Executive Summary

This is the third report of the Faculty Salary Equity Review (FSER) Committee to address potential salary inequity by gender and underrepresented minority (URM) status. Prior reports are available on the Academic Affairs webpage.

At the request of Chancellor Hawgood, the FSER Committee was reconvened in December 2016 with the following charges:

1. Review action plans submitted by the schools and provide the chancellor with recommendations based on these reports.
2. Consider changes to the methodology and/or data capture for the salary equity analysis that have been proposed by the Schools of Medicine and Pharmacy with the goal of improving future analyses.

Charge 1: The Committee reviewed and evaluated the action plans of each school. No salary inequities were identified by the Schools of Dentistry, Medicine and Pharmacy. On the basis of an identified inequity, an upward salary adjustment of $\$ 12 \mathrm{~K}$ was made for one faculty member in the School of Nursing.

Based upon review of the action plans, the Committee makes the following observations and recommendations:

- The determination of whether salary imbalances are justified by legitimate non-discriminatory business practices has subjective inputs. Bias may influence whether or not schools/departments identify salary inequities that warrant correction.
- To facilitate the establishment and maintenance of equitable pay at UCSF, school/department compensation plans should be made explicit regarding the determination of negotiated $(\mathrm{Y})$ salary amounts, and regarding the eligibility for and determination of $Z$ payments. In addition, schools/departments should ensure equal opportunity for activities that link to $Y$ and $Z$ salary payments (e.g., clinical and administrative opportunities).
- Although excluded from FSER analyses to date, $Z$ payments for administrative stipends should be evaluated for imbalances and inequities by gender and URM status.

Charge 2: The Committee adopted several changes to the methodology, data capture, and timing for future salary equity analyses. In addition, the Committee also emphasized two additional general recommendations:

- For large departments, schools are strongly encouraged to conduct analyses at the division and/or subspecialty level.
- Schools are encouraged to engage a school-based faculty advisory committee, such as the Compensation Plan Committee or School Leadership Council, to provide feedback on school action plans prior to submission to the campus.

The Committee also reaffirms the importance of ongoing annual salary equity analyses and monitoring.

## UC SAN FRANCISCO 2017 FACULTY SALARY EQUITY REVIEW APRIL 2017

## BACKGROUND

In January 2015, Chancellor Hawgood received and approved a campus-wide 2014 Faculty Salary Equity Review Report. The review was conducted by a joint Academic Senate and Administration Steering Committee ("FSER" or the "Committee"), and the full report was made available to faculty. Deans of the four professional schools were asked by the chancellor to address any faculty salary imbalances or inequities that may exist and to report school findings and action plans by July 2015.

In September 2015, Chancellor Hawgood reconvened the FSER Committee to review the action plans submitted by the four schools. This review was also conducted in conjunction with the 2015-16 Academic Salary Program announced by UC Office of the President (UCOP) in August 2015. The Committee Submitted their report to the Chancellor and to UCOP at the end of January 2016, with an addendum submitted in April 2016.

Per the original FSER report, the schools were provided with an updated data set in July 2016 and were expected to submit to the Chancellor a progress report on their action plan by November 30, 2016. At the request of Chancellor Hawgood, the FSER Committee was reconvened to conduct a third Faculty Salary Equity Review. Vice Provost Brian Alldredge served as the committee chair (see appendix A for committee membership).

## COMMITTEE CHARGE:

The charge of the 2016-17 FSER committee was two-fold:

1. Review action plans submitted by the schools and provide the chancellor with recommendations based on these reports.
2. Consider changes to the methodology and/or data capture for the salary equity analysis that have been proposed by the Schools of Medicine and Pharmacy with the goal of improving future analyses.

## CHARGE \#1: REVIEW SCHOOL ACTION PLANS

## Background

As was done for academic year 2015-16, the four UCSF health professional schools continued their work to examine any evidence of inequities in faculty salaries by either underrepresented minority status (URMs) or by gender (female, male). The following table shows historical information regarding discretionary salary adjustments from the 2015-16 FSER report.

| School | 2015-2016 |
| :---: | :--- |
| Dentistry | No adjustments in negotiated ("Y") salary |
| Medicine | \$1.819M in adjustments to negotiated ("Y") <br> salary for 175 faculty |
| Nursing | No adjustments in negotiated ("Y") salary |
| Pharmacy | No adjustments in negotiated ("Y") salary |

In July 2016, Committee retrieved the salary data for the academic year 2016-17 and provided it to the schools for analysis. The schools were provided with the following guidance to facilitate the development of school-level action plans:

- The Committee suggests that schools analyze their data using the methodology described in prior FSER reports. Where appropriate, the Committee suggests analyzing data to generate "residuals," which is the difference between a model-based prediction and the actual salary, as a useful way to identify individuals whose salaries are above or below the amount predicted by the model based on department, rank, degree type and other covariates. Schools may also choose to analyze data at the level of departments and/or to include other factors that potentially contribute to salary imbalance but are not included in the campus-wide report (2014-15).
- If the school-level analysis reveals an imbalance, the school must determine if the salary differences are attributable to non-discriminatory legitimate business practices of the university or campus unit. Salary imbalances not justified by legitimate business practices are considered "inequities".
- School action plans must include specific strategies to address inequities that are found. If school-level analyses reveal no evidence of salary inequity, the action plan should include a justification for this finding.
- School action plans must include specific timeframes for addressing salary inequities.
- School action plans must be made transparent to the faculty in the school.
- School action plans are due November 30, 2016.


## Committee Review for 2016-2017

The FSER Committee performed a detailed, comprehensive review of the action plan submitted by each school. Additional information and/or analysis were requested when such information was critical to ensuring that salary equity principles are adequately addressed. The chart below summarizes the schools' initial findings with regard to salary inequities, the Committee's response, and the Committee's recommendation after reviewing any requested supplemental reports. To meet the guiding principle of transparency of this process to all faculty, the full analyses and action plan of each school appear as appendices to this report.

Table 1. Summary of Committee Review

| School | Action Plan/Report <br> Submission | Initial School Findings and Committee <br> Response | Final Committee <br> Response and <br> Recommendation |
| :---: | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Nursing | Original action plan: <br> November 16, 2016 | School Findings: No statistically significant <br> evidence of salary inequities. Residual and <br> Fatched pair analyses also conducted. <br> Final action plan: <br> analysis and has been corrected <br> anait pair <br> retroactive to 7/1/16 (\$12K) <br> March 1, 2017 <br> (Appendix B) | Committee Response: Requested follow up <br> to establish that faculty in one department <br> were made aware of the process for <br> negotiation of Y salaries. | | Accept action plan |
| :--- |
| and correction of one |
| identified salary |
| inequity (\$12K). |


| Pharmacy | Original action plan: <br> October 13, 2016 <br> Final action plan: <br> March 6, 2017 <br> (Appendix C) | School Findings: No statistically significant evidence of inequities. Detailed justifications were provided for salary differences noted in unadjusted analyses. <br> Committee Response: Requested adjusted analysis by gender at school level and additional information on underlying factors for differences between URM and nonURM faculty. | Accepted supplemental analyses and action plan; no inequities found. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Medicine | Original action plan: <br> November 30, 2016 <br> Updated action plan: <br> March 13, 2017 <br> (Appendix D) | School Findings: Statistically significant salary ( $\mathrm{X}+\mathrm{Y}$ ) differences were reported for six departments. Additional analyses and/or justifications provided by each department to explain that imbalances did not represent salary inequities were accepted by the Dean's Office. <br> Committee Response: Requested additional analyses and detail to support the school's initial finding of no salary inequities. | Accepted supplemental analyses and action plan; no inequities found. |
| Dentistry | Original action plan: <br> February 4, 2017 <br> Updated action plan: <br> March 16, 2017 <br> (Appendix E) | School Findings: No statistically significant evidence of inequities. Residual and matched pair analyses also supported a finding of no inequities. <br> Committee Response: Requested clarification on process for assigning compensated clinical duties, information about a search, additional analysis by matched pair, and confirmation of clinical incentive payment amounts by gender. | Accepted supplemental analyses and action plan; no inequities found. |

## Discussion \& Recommendations:

The FSER Committee reaffirms some of the challenges related to the ability to meet Charge \#1 that were identified in the 2015-16 FSER report:

- There are more than two dozen compensation plans across the campus. This leads to complexity in assessing how faculty salaries are determined and whether inequities (versus imbalances) exist. Similarly, how salary support is determined for administrative roles is not standardized across the schools or even by departments within the schools.
- Determination of whether salary imbalances are "justified by legitimate non-discriminatory business practices" has subjective inputs. For various reasons-e.g. complexity of analysis, potential for cost implications, and departmental needs for faculty who have very diverse activities with varying funding sources-bias may influence whether or not departments identify inequities that warrant correction.

To facilitate the establishment and maintenance of equitable compensation at UCSF, the Faculty Salary Equity Review Committee recommends the following:

- In recognition of the complexity of salary components at UCSF, the Committee recommends that school and/or department compensation plans be explicit regarding how negotiated salaries (Y) are determined and periodically re-evaluated.
- Schools and/or department compensation plans should be explicit with regard to eligibility for and calculation of $Z$ salary payments:
- Departments for which incentives are tied to clinical productivity (RVUs or other calculations) should ensure that the availability of these opportunities is equitable and transparent.
- Z payments for administrative roles, whether University of California Retirement Plan (UCRP) covered compensation (STP) or non-UCRP covered compensation (BYN), have historically been excluded from the data set for analyses as these stipends are not applied consistently for similar roles across the campus. In the 2015-16 FSER report, it was noted that particular attention should be paid to the appropriate use of $Z$ payments for administrative roles rather than incorporating these payments into negotiated $(\mathrm{Y})$ salary. However, in some instances, imbalances in Y salaries continue to be attributed to the incumbent holding an administrative role. Taking this into consideration, along with the recommendation that the process for assigning leadership positions must be transparent to facilitate equal opportunity for all faculty, the Committee conducted a preliminary review of the presence of administrative stipends by gender and URM status. While this preliminary review did not identify any obvious trends, the Committee recommends that further analysis be undertaken in 2017-18.
- Schools and departments should consider excellence in teaching, mentoring, and service activities that further the mission of the university as justification for higher negotiated (Y) salary.
- Individuals who have engaged their division chief (if applicable) and chair and who continue to have questions regarding salary equity may contact the vice or associate dean of academic affairs in their school.

Although not within the purview of the FSER Committee, members recommended that efforts be made to ensure the equitable application of department discretionary funds and bridge funding within schools and departments. The committee also encourages the relevant Academic Senate committees to develop approaches that aid in the identification and prevention of salary imbalances across the faculty life cycle.

## CHARGE \#2: IMPROVEMENTS IN METHODOLOGY

## Background

The schools have prepared, and the FSER Committee has reviewed, two action plans (2015-16 and 2016-17). This has afforded the Committee an opportunity to consider process improvements for future reviews. In particular, the FSER Committee considered two areas for improvement: 1) the production of the data set and timing of the review process, and 2) guiding principles for the analysis and development of the school action plans.

## Analysis \& Recommendations

## I. Production of Data Set and Timing of Review Process

The FSER Committee considered recommendations to improve the accuracy of the data set and the timeliness of the campus review process.

Data Field Improvements: At the suggestion of the School of Medicine, the Committee considered and approved the following technical adjustments to future data sets for reporting Clinical Incentive (Z) payments:

- The data field titled "gross" instead of "rate"' should be used to lessen the impact of postaccounting processes within School of Medicine. This does not impact the other schools.
- "Accounting period" should be used rather than the "earned date" to help mitigate variation in clinical incentive payment processing times.

It should be noted that while these adjustments have the potential to improve the accuracy of the data set, they do not significantly change or impact the validity of prior reports.

Data Set Timing: The data sets for 2015-16 and 2016-17 were produced in early July of the respective years in order to meet UC Office of the President (UCOP) reporting requirements as well as to ensure that any necessary salary adjustments identified in the schools' action plans could be made within the fiscal year in which the analysis was conducted. It is important to note that the data sets include salary data ( X +Y ) for the current year and clinical incentive data (Z) for the prior year. For example, the July 2016 data set included salary data for the 2016-17 academic year and clinical incentive data for the 2015-16 academic year. Historic clinical incentive pay data are used because payments cannot be calculated until after the work has been performed, i.e. they cannot be predicted.

While many negotiated salary adjustments and advancement actions are approved and recorded in the payroll system (the source of the data set) by early July, it was acknowledged that there are always some late submissions that would not be reflected in the July data set. The Committee reviewed the 2016 transaction data for promotions and new negotiated salary rates and found that approximately $11 \%$ of the transactions were processed late, i.e. after July 1, and therefore were not captured in the July data set. Further analysis revealed that moving the data set production date from July to September would improve the capture rate of all transactions from $89 \%$ to $98 \%$, respectively.

Campus Review Process: While delaying the production of the data set would result in more accurate data, the Committee considered the impact to the review process if the data set were to be made available to the schools in September. To date, UCOP has expected a detailed report on the campus' salary review process by January/February of the year fiscal year being reviewed. At UCSF, the entire review process, from data set production to final report issued, has taken approximately 10 months. By condensing this process to 8 months, the Committee believes that producing the data set on September 1 can be accommodated. Of note:

- The revised process results in the schools having one less month ( $4 \rightarrow 3$ months) to analyze the data set and prepare their action plan. The Committee believes that the guiding principles (outlined in the next section) as well as the growing expertise within the schools in conducting the analysis over the past two cycles will mitigate the impact of less time to prepare their action plans.
- The revised process will still allow any salary adjustments identified in the schools' action plans to be made within the fiscal year in which the analysis was conducted (and retroactive to July 1 of that year).
- Due to the nature of the Health Sciences Compensation Plan and the timing of the salary negotiation process, the Committee recommends that the campus report be submitted in April. The Committee acknowledges that this is after the anticipated January or February UCOP reporting deadline, but it allows the Committee to follow our guiding principle of conducting a comprehensive and robust salary review.



## Summary of Recommendations:

- Data fields will be updated in future data sets in response to the request from the School of Medicine.
- Data set will be produced on September 1 instead of July 1.
- Review process will be condensed to 8 months, with the final report issued in April.


## II. Guiding principles for the analysis and development of the school action plans.

As noted in the 2014 Faculty Salary Equity Review Report, local (school-level) implementation of action plans are the most effective way to address any imbalances that are identified at the school level. In recognition of the wide variance of faculty populations within and between the schools, the 2014 report only provided general instructions for the action plans in order to allow the schools discretion in both their analysis and how their findings were reported.

Based on their review and analysis of action plans over two years from each of the schools (2015-16 and 2016-17), the Committee is now able to provide more detailed guidelines and best practices to the schools for future action plans. The intent of these principles is to ensure consistent analytic rigor and standardized approaches across schools, when appropriate. In addition, by clearly defining the expectations for future action plans, it is anticipated that less time will be spent seeking additional data, analysis, and clarification during the Committee's review process. This will facilitate the review process timeline identified in the section above and will also allow time for the Committee to engage in deeper discussion of broader topics related to salary equity.

Recommendations:

- Guiding principles for school action plans:
- Analysis of the data set provided by the campus is required.
- Schools should, at a minimum, conduct analyses at the school and department levels.
- For large departments, schools are strongly encouraged to conduct analyses at the division and/or subspecialty level. To facilitate this analysis, future data sets will include a specific data field to identify the division. As a general guideline, a sample size of 40-60 faculty within a unit (e.g., division or department) can usually support the recommended statistical analysis. In addition, when statistical modeling can support the generation of residuals, this analysis is encouraged as a means to identify individual faculty whose salaries are more or less than predicted. If the recommended analysis cannot be conducted due to small sample size, then a matched pair analysis should be conducted. In such an analysis, matched sets are formed on the basis of rank, series, step, and department, if possible. Comparisons are made by gender or URM status and an indepth assessment is carried out as to whether any differences in salary are due to legitimate business practices or represent an inequity.
- If a school or department has a compelling reason to conduct an additional analysis (e.g., use of additional relevant covariates), then the justification and methods should also be included in the action plan.
- Any data set used for additional analysis (e.g., modification of the individual level data or inclusion/exclusion of additional populations) should be archived by the school.
- The schools should consider the following best practices:
- Table 33 from Appendix C (the School of Pharmacy report) can be a template used for initial reporting by the schools.
- Some of the schools are currently engaging a school-based faculty advisory committee, such as the Compensation Plan Committee or the school Leadership Council, to provide preliminary feedback on the school action plan prior to submission to the campus. This practice is encouraged for all schools.


## CONCLUSION

With the submission of this report, the charges to this committee are complete. The Committee concludes by re-emphasizing three general recommendations made within this report:

1. For large departments, schools are strongly encouraged to conduct analyses at the division and/or subspecialty level. To facilitate this analysis, future data sets will include corresponding data fields when available.
2. The Committee encourages the generation of residuals as a means to identify individual faculty whose salaries are greater than or less than predicted. When statistical testing and/or generation of residuals cannot be conducted due to small sample size, then matched pair analysis is encouraged.
3. Schools are encouraged to engage a school-based faculty advisory committee, such as the Compensation Plan Committee or school Leadership Council, to provide feedback on school action plans prior to submission to the campus.

The Committee also reaffirms the importance of ongoing annual salary equity analyses and monitoring.

## Appendix A. Committee Membership

The Faculty Salary Equity Review (FSER) Committee consisted of the following members:

| Member Name | Administrative/Academic Titles |
| :---: | :---: |
| Brian Alldredge, PharmD, Chair | Vice Provost Academic Affairs Professor of Clinical Pharmacy |
| Sheila Brear, BDS | Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, School of Dentistry Health Sciences Associate Clinical Professor, Department of Preventive and Restorative Dental Sciences |
| DorAnne Donesky*, PhD, ANP-BC | Representative, Academic Senate Faculty Welfare Committee Associate Adjunct Professor, Physiological Nursing |
| Shari L. Dworkin, PhD, MS | Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, School of Nursing Professor, Social and Behavioral Sciences |
| Elena Fuentes-Afflick, MD, MPH | Vice Dean for Academic Affairs and Faculty Development, School of Medicine <br> Professor, Pediatrics |
| David Glidden, PhD | Representative, Academic Senate Committee on Academic Personnel Professor in Residence, Epidemiology \& Biostatistics |
| Wilson Hardcastle, MLIS | Academic Data Coordinator, Office of Academic Affairs |
| Joan Hilton*, ScD, MPH | Representative, Academic Senate Committee on Equal Opportunity Professor in Residence, Epidemiology \& Biostatistics |
| Thomas Kearney, PharmD | Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, School of Pharmacy Professor of Clinical Pharmacy |
| Cynthia Lynch Leathers, MBA | Assistant Vice Provost Academic Affairs |
| Catherine Lomen-Hoerth, MD, PhD | Professor of Clinical Neurology |
| Charles E. McCulloch, PhD | Professor, Epidemiology \& Biostatistics |
| Renee Navarro, MD, PharmD | Vice Chancellor for Diversity and Outreach Professor of Clinical Anesthesia \& Perioperative Care |
| Susan Sall*, MHA | Project Manager |

*New representatives beginning 2016-2017

## Appendix B. FSER Report- School of Nursing

## School of Nursing Faculty Salary Equity Report and Action Plan

Updated Final Draft: March 1, 2017
Shari L. Dworkin, Ph.D., M.S.
Associate Dean for Academic Affairs

## UCSF SCHOOL OF NURSING-LEVEL FACULTY SALARY EQUITY REPORT

Purpose: The purpose of the analysis was to determine the presence and size of imbalance in faculty salary and accelerated academic advancement by race/ethnicity and gender within the School of Nursing. Data for this study was from the time period of: July 1, 2015 to June 30, 2016.

Analysis Plan: The analysis of the School of Nursing (SON) data followed the analysis plan of the overall UCSF 2014 and 2015 Faculty Salary Equity Review (FSER).

Race/ethnicity was recoded into a variable of underrepresented minority (URM) versus (vs) non-URM. URM was defined as those who identified as Black or African American, Hispanic, Native
American/Alaskan Native, Filipino, or Hawaiian/Pacific Islander. Non-URM was defined as those who identified as White, Asian, or declined to state. Gender was coded as female or male.

The data specific to the SON was provided by Office of Academic Affairs, UCSF Human Resources.
The SON had 86 faculty members (in the broader campus report, faculty members were included who were greater than or equal to $75 \%$ time-SON followed the definition used within the broader campus analysis) who were included in the overall UCSF FSER. Seventy-seven ( $89.5 \%$ ) were female and 9 ( $10.5 \%$ ) were male. Sixteen (18.6\%) were URM and 70 ( $81.4 \%$ ) were Non-URM.

Annual salary rates ( $\mathrm{X}+\mathrm{Y}$ ) were obtained on July 1, 2016. Salary amounts ( $\mathrm{X}+\mathrm{Y}$ or Z ) were adjusted to full-time status by dividing by the percent effort of appointment. Salary amounts ( $\mathrm{X}+\mathrm{Y}$ or Z ) were log transformed to reduce the possible influence of a very few high salaries and to provide interpretations in terms of percent differences in median salaries. Although there weren't any extreme salaries in the SON data, log transformed data were used in the SON analyses as well, in order to be comparable to the overall UCSF FSER analyses.

Z payment data represents the total Z payments received between July 1, 2015 and June 30, 2016. Z payments were analyzed by comparing the likelihood of receiving any $Z$ payment between the genders and the two URM groups.

The primary analyses were carried out through regression approaches.
Multiple linear regression analyses were conducted to test for URM vs non-URM and female vs male imbalances in the log transformed salary amounts ( $\mathrm{X}+\mathrm{Y}$ ). Coefficients from the regression analyses were back transformed to obtain a ratio interpretation. The results are reported with unadjusted estimates of the relative ratio (RR) with $95 \%$ confidence intervals (CI) and adjusted relative ratios (aRR) and $95 \% \mathrm{Cl}$. The covariates that were included in the adjusted models were 1) Step, 2) Rank: Professor, Associate, or Assistant, 3) Doctorate type: Clinical, Research, or Other, 4) Series: Ladder rank or in Residence, Clinical X or HS Clinical, or Adjunct, and 5) Department: Community Health Systems (CHS), Family Health Care Nursing (FHCN), Physiological Nursing (PN), and Social and Behavioral Sciences (SBS).

The presence of a Z payment or presence of an accelerated advancement was first examined with Chisquare test of proportions and the Fisher Exact test and then was modeled with binomial logistic regression if appropriate.

## Results

It should be noted that the relatively small total sample size of SON faculty (86) and the small percentage of males ( $10.5 \%$ ) or URM ( $18.6 \%$ ) does not provide much power to detect statistically significant ( $p<.05$ ) differences between males and females or between URMs and non-URMs unless the effects were relatively large.

## Salary, Z payments, and Acceleration by Gender Status

Both the unadjusted and the adjusted analyses controlling for step, rank, doctorate, series, and department did not indicate the presence of a statistically significant female vs male imbalance in $\mathrm{X}+\mathrm{Y}$ salary (See Table 1).

The unadjusted female/male RR of median $X+Y$ salaries was 1.00 (CI 0.85, 1.18). After adjustment, the aRR of median $X+Y$ salaries was 0.96 ( $\mathrm{Cl} 0.88,1.04$ ); this was not statistically significant ( $p=0.33$ ). Only step and rank were statistically significant independent variables in the multiple linear regression analysis. As step went up salary went up. Assistant Professors made less salary than Associate Professors and Associate Professors made less salary than Full Professors.

One of the 9 male SON faculty members (11.1\%) received a Z payment. Two of the 77 female faculty members ( $2.6 \%$ ) had a Z payment. The difference between these two proportions was not statistically significant (two-tailed Fisher Exact p=0.29). It was possible to calculate an unadjusted odds ratio for female gender related to having a $Z$ payment. The unadjusted odds ratio for female gender was 0.21 (CI $0.02,2.62$ ). However, with only one male receiving a $Z$ payment, using binomial logistic regression to get an adjusted odds ratio was statistically inappropriate.

None of the 9 male SON faculty members ( $0 \%$ ) had experienced an accelerated merit or promotion. Four of the 77 female faculty members ( $5.2 \%$ ) had an accelerated merit or promotion. The difference between these two proportions was not statistically significant (two-tailed Fisher Exact $p=1.00$ ). The lack of any males having an accelerated merit or promotion made the calculation of an odds ratio and using binomial logistic regression to get an adjusted ratio statistically inappropriate.

Neither of the 2 female faculty members who received a Z payment, 0 (0\%) also had an accelerated merit or promotion. The one male faculty member who had a $Z$ payment did not also have an accelerated merit or promotion.

Table 1
Female/Male X+Y Pay Ratio

|  | Ratio | 95\% Confidence Interval |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Unadjusted | 1.00 | $(0.85,1.18)$ |
| Fully Adjusted | 0.96 | $(0.88,1.04)$ |

## Salary, Z Payments, and Acceleration by URM Status

Both the unadjusted and the adjusted analyses controlling for step, rank, doctorate, series, and department did not indicate the presence of a statistically significant URM vs Non-URM imbalance in $\mathrm{X}+$ Y salary (See Table 2).

The unadjusted URM/Non-URM RR of median $\mathrm{X}+\mathrm{Y}$ salaries was 0.91 (CI 0.80, 1.04). After adjustment, the aRR of median $X+Y$ salaries was 0.96 (CI $0.90,1.03$ ). This was not statistically significant ( $p=$
0.28). Only step and rank were statistically significant independent variables in the multiple linear regression analysis. As step went up salary went up. Assistant Professors made less salary than Associate Professors and Associate Professors made less salary than Full Professors.

None of the 16 URM SON faculty members, $0(0 \%)$ received a $Z$ payment. Three of the 70 non-URM faculty members (4.3\%) had a Z payment. The difference between these two proportions was not statistically significant (two-tailed Fisher Exact $p=1.00$ ). Since none of the URM faculty members received a Z payment, it was statistically inappropriate to calculate an unadjusted or adjusted odds ratio.

One of the 16 URM SON faculty members (6.3\%) received an accelerated merit or promotion. Three of the 70 Non-URM faculty members (4.3\%) had an accelerated merit or promotion. The difference between these two proportions was not statistically significant (two-tailed Fisher Exact $p=0.57$ ). It was possible to calculate an unadjusted odds ratio for URM related to having an accelerated merit or promotion. The unadjusted odds ratio was not statistically significant ( $p=0.74$ ). The unadjusted odds ratio was 1.49 (CI $0.15,15.32$ ). However, with only one URM faculty member having an accelerated merit or promotion, using binomial logistic regression to get an adjusted odds ratio was statistically inappropriate.)

Table 2
URM/Non-URM X+Y Pay Ratio

|  | Ratio | $95 \%$ Confidence Interval |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Unadjusted | 0.91 | $(0.80,1.04)$ |
| Fully Adjusted | 0.96 | $(0.86,1.03)$ |

## Summary and Conclusions

In the School of Nursing, we found (1) no evidence of a salary imbalance by under-represented minority status in salary $(X+Y)$, the presence of clinical incentives $(Z)$, and no evidence of difference between URM and non-URM faculty in the presence of an accelerated advancement. However, despite finding no statistically significant imbalance in salary ( $\mathrm{X}+\mathrm{Y}$ ) between URM and non-URM, we found a trend whereby URM received 4\% lower salaries than did non-URM controlling for covariates (2) no statistically significant imbalance in salary $(X+Y)$ by gender. Despite finding no statistically significant imbalance in salary between women and men, we found a trend whereby women received 4 percent lower salaries $(X+Y)$ compared to men controlling for all covariates; (3) No statistically significant imbalance by gender in the presence or absence of a clinical $Z$ payment; (4) no statistically significant difference by gender with respect to the presence of accelerated academic advancements.

Because males make up only $10.5 \%$ of the 86 faculty in this sample and URM constitute $18.6 \%$ of the faculty in this sample, we do not have adequate power to determine statistically significant differences between groups, unless the effects are relatively large. However, in order to understand the trends in $\mathrm{X}+\mathrm{Y}$ salary discussed above, SON carried out a matched pair analysis to determine if any of the imbalances in pay were due to inequities or legitimate business practices. These results showed that none of the matched pairs in the gender analysis were found to be due to an inequity in pay and all were found to be due to legitimate business practices. We found 1 URM faculty member who was paid less than their NonURM matches and this difference was not due to normal business practices. Thus, this salary was corrected at the Department level retroactively for 2015-2016. See Appendix A for more detail on the matched pair analysis. All other imbalances by URM status were due to legitimate business practices.

A few of our faculty members do not have a perfect match in our ad hoc matched pair analysis; changing the choice of methodologies may yield a slightly different analysis and conclusions. The SON therefore ran an additional residual analysis where predicted salaries are based on department, rank, step, degree and series (using the same method of analysis that was carried out by CM for Dentistry last year). Results from the residual analysis showed that we have only two faculty members who make less than the predicted salary - these were mid-career ladder rank faculty members and their lower pay was due to
receiving lower levels of grant money. This imbalance is a result of legitimate business practice and not due to inequity. We also found 7 faculty who
were paid more than model predictions-again-the differences were due to higher levels of grant money received and these differences are determined to be due to normal business practices.

## Action Plans

1. The School of Nursing invested in a Diversity Initiative in 2015 in order to increase its critical mass of faculty of color, particularly from under-represented minority groups. Our proportion of faculty of color was $12 \%$ in 2015 and is $19 \%$ now-our School-level goal is to reach $30 \%$ by 2020.
2. The SON is committed to repeating salary equity analyses in the future. Should the SON find statistically significant imbalances in any of the outcomes in future years, a faculty sub-committee will be formed to work with the Associate Dean for Academic Affairs to determine the root causes of the imbalance (e.g., workload differences, grantsmanship productivity, inequity in pay).
3. If future SON analyses uncover an inequity by gender or URM status, the School will determine a plan to rectify salary, acceleration, or $Z$ payment imbalances.
4. Despite the fact that there were not any statistically significant salary imbalances, the SON carried out an additional analysis using matched pairs to understand salary differences more deeply. The results are included in Appendix A. We also carried out a residual analysis. While all but one ladder rank and adjunct faculty difference in salary were due to differences in grant money received, 1 URM faculty in the Clinical series was found have an $X+Y$ salary \$12,000 lower than their non URM matches. The Associate Dean for Academic Affairs discussed this with the Chair of this Department and the Chair rectified the imbalances in pay for the 2015-2016 year. The root cause for this pay difference was identified and will be changed at the Department level.
5. Associate Dean Dworkin recommends that all SON Chairs who are hiring faculty members should check the rank, step, and salary with her office prior to finalizing the offer letter to ensure salary equity at the point of entry into the institution. This can reduce some salary differences between men and women and between URM and Non-URM faculty.
6. Associate Dean Dworkin has assembled a sub-committee (all of the SON Vice Chairs) that has read this report and contributed to it. This sub-committee also contributed to the action plans detailed here. One additional action step that the sub-committee suggested was to try to systematize salary equity proactively more so at the institutional level so as to reduce salary inequity within and across schools.

## Acknowledgments

The School of Nursing is grateful to Dr. Steven Paul who replicated the methodology found in the campuslevel report for the School-level analysis. He ran the statistical analyses and led the writing of the results section. The School of Nursing is grateful to the salary equity faculty subcommittee who commented on this report and contributed to the action plans.

# FSER Committee -March 2017 <br> Matched Pair Analysis 

UCSF School of Nursing
Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Shari L. Dworkin, Ph.D., M.S.

## URM analysis:

1. Despite non-significant differences in salary between URM and non-URM in SON, a trend showed URM earned 4\% less than non-URM faculty (the 2015 report showed a $7 \%$ difference)
2. Matched pair analysis was carried out with 16 URM faculty for 2016
3. Pairs were matched on rank, step, and series
4. Where more than 1 perfect match was found, salaries were averaged
5. Eleven URM faculty made less than non-URM in the matched pairs (4 URM made more than their non-URM match and 1 URM made the same as their non-URM match). 6 of these were ladder rank faculty-5 due to grant $\$ / Y$ and 1 due to lower APU (investigated and found to be legitimate). 5 of these were Clinical faculty and all 5 were investigated ( 4 were legitimate; 1 inequity existed).
6. Four of five cases where a salary difference exists among Clinical Faculty were found among those who solely/primarily teach versus those who have access to grant and/or clinical income.

CASE 1: Ladder rank URM Faculty member made 6K more than non-URM match
Reason for difference: Imperfect match; no perfect match exists for the rank and step of this URM faculty and thus we had to use 3 cases that were 1 step away and averaged them
Conclusion: The Y factor of the matches was higher even though the base salary was lower than the URM faculty. The difference in salary was due to grant money/clinical income differences $/ Y$ factor. Normal business practices.

CASE 2: HS Clinical URM faculty member makes 13K less than non-URM matches.
Reason for difference: URM faculty member had a lower APU than the other matches due to lower workload and a lower $Y$ factor
Conclusion: Associate Dean Dworkin discussed this with the Department Chair and the root cause was identified; it was unrelated to race or gender but was related to how $Y$ factors were being calculated at the Department level. The practices leading to this root cause disparity have been changed and the lower pay has been retroactively corrected.

Case 3: HS Clinical URM faculty member makes 21 K less than non-URM matches
Reason for difference: $Y$ factor
Conclusion: All HS Clinical $Y$ differences in pay except Case 2 were due to a teaching pay vs grant/clinical income pay differences. These differences were due to legitimate business practices

Case 4: HSCP faculty member who is URM who makes 22 K less than non-URM match.
Reason for difference: $Y$ factor
Conclusion: All HS Clinical Y differences except Case 2 were due to either a teaching pay vs grant/clinical income pay difference. These were due to legitimate business practices

Case 5: Ladder rank faculty member who is URM makes $\$ 19,000$ more than non-URM matches
Reason for difference: This is an administrative role that earns a stipend.
Conclusion: Normal business practices.
Case 6: Ladder rank URM faculty makes $\$ 23,000$ less than matched non-URM faculty

Reason for difference: $Y$ factor/grant money
Conclusion: Normal business practices
Case 7: URM ladder rank faculty makes 11 K less than non-URM match
Reason for difference: Faculty had a lower APU than non-URM matches. Y is 4 K less than the average Y of matches.
Conclusion: All HS Clinical Y differences except Case 2 were due to a teaching pay vs grant/clinical income pay difference. Legitimate business practices

Case 8: Ladder rank faculty member (URM) makes 21 K less than non-URM match
Reason for difference: Imperfect match; no perfect match exists and thus we had to use a match 1 step away (higher). 10K of the difference is $Y$ factor and grant money.
Conclusion: Normal business practices.
Case 9: Ladder rank faculty member who is URM makes 21 K less than match.
Reason for difference: Imperfect match; no perfect match exists and thus we had to use a match 1 step away. 10K of the difference is the $Y$ factor and grant money.
Conclusion: Normal Business Practices
Case 10: Ladder rank faculty member who is URM makes 5 K less than the average of 4 non-URM matches
Reason for Difference: Y factor/grant money.
Conclusion: Normal business practices
Case 11: In-Residence URM faculty member makes the same as non-URM faculty member matches (ladder)
Conclusion: No difference in salary
Case 12: HS Clinical URM faculty member makes 6K more than non-URM faculty matches
Reason for Difference: Non-URM matches had a lower APU and lower workload
Conclusion: Normal business practices
Case 13: HS Clinical URM faculty member makes 21,000 less than the average of 3 non-URM matches Reason for Difference: Y factor
Conclusion: All HS Clinical differences except Case 2 were due to a teaching pay vs grant/clinical income pay difference. These were due to legitimate business practices

Case 14: HS Clinical URM faculty member makes 6K less than non-URM match (we have no non-URM match)
Reason for Difference: Y factor
Conclusion: No non-URM match exists-both are URM faculty
Case 15: Adjunct URM faculty member makes 10K more than matches
Reason for Difference: Imperfect match; no perfect match exists for rank and step and thus we had to use 3 cases that were 1 step away and averaged them. URM faculty member has more grant money/Y factor. This particular faculty member made less than other faculty members in the last analysis and her salary was raised.
Conclusion: Normal business practices
Case 16: Adjunct URM faculty member makes 31K more than matches who are Non-URM. Only HS Clinical faculty members could be matched to this adjunct faculty member for rank and step.

Reason for Difference: Grant \$/Y Factor
Conclusion: Normal business practices

## Gender analysis: Women and Men

1. Despite non-significant differences in our salary analysis between women and men in SON, a trend showed that women make $4 \%$ less than male faculty members (in 2015, women made 3\% less)
2. Matched pair analysis was carried out with 9 men
3. Pairs were matched on rank, step, and series
4. Where more than 1 perfect match was found, we averaged the salaries of the matches
5. $\mathbf{5}$ of 9 men made more than their matched women faculty (3 made less than matched women faculty and 1 male made the same amount as matched woman faculty)
6. These faculty are from 4 different departments--so no evidence of a particular department having a higher distribution of women faculty making a lower salary

Case 1: Ladder rank female faculty member makes 50K less than male match
Reason for difference: Imperfect match; no perfect match exists for rank and step and thus we had to use 1 case that was 1 step lower. Grant money/Y accounts for most of the difference. Solid workload differences account for the APU difference.
Conclusion: The salary difference was due to regular business practices and not equity related reasons
Case 2: Ladder rank female faculty member makes 87 K less than male match
Reason for difference: Grant money/Y
Conclusion: The salary difference was due to legitimate business practices
Case 3: Ladder rank female faculty member makes 19 K more than male match
Reason for difference: Grant money/Y and Chair stipend for female faculty member.
Conclusion: The salary difference was due to regular business practices and not equity related reasons. Update: this male faculty member left UCSF.

Case 4: Two HS Clinical female matches make, on average, 42K less than male faculty
Reason: Y/Grant \$
Conclusion: This was an opportunity open to all faculty---a male had the specialty expertise needed for the position. Normal business practices. No evidence of inequity.

Case 5: Health Sciences Clinical female faculty member makes the same as male match
Reason for difference: Same X, X', and Y
Conclusion: The salary is the same.

Case 6: Five HS Clinical female faculty members who are matched to 1 HS Clinical male faculty member 6K less than the male faculty member
Reason for difference: Y factor
Conclusion: The salary difference was due to regular business practices and not equity related reasons.
Update: This male faculty member left the university.
Case 7: Ladder rank female faculty member makes 14 K more than male matches
Reason for difference: Y/Grant \$\$

Conclusion: The salary difference was due to legitimate business practices and not equity related reasons

Case 8: Ladder rank female faculty member makes 16 K less than male match
Reason for difference: APU and Y/Grant \$\$
Conclusion: Workload differences do exist and grant \$ account for the rest of the difference. Regular business practices and not equity related reasons

Case 9: Two ladder rank female faculty members whose salaries were averaged to be a match for a male faculty member make 16 K more than male match
Reason for difference: Y factor/grant \$
Conclusion: The salary difference was due to legitimate business practices and not equity related reasons

Overall: No salary adjustments are recommended to Departments or to VPAA/the Chancellor's office concerning male/female differences in SON

## Communication plan:

1) Associate Dean Dworkin presented the SON FSER results at the November 2016 Full Faculty meeting
2) Results will be presented at the March Faculty Council meeting (2017)
3) the main SON Salary Equity Report will be publically available on the Faculty Council website and the website of the Associate Dean for Academic Affairs

## Appendix C: FSER Report- School of Pharmacy

Faculty Salary Review for the School of Pharmacy
2016

## Background:

Chancellor Hawgood's UCSF campus wide 2014 equity analysis of faculty salaries (http://tiny.ucsf.edu/fser) was released campus-wide on February 2, 2015.

As background, the analysis was undertaken to determine evidence of campus wide inequities in faculty salaries for underrepresented minorities (URMs) or by gender (male vs female).

- Gender: The campus-wide results revealed a statistically significant imbalance with females receiving a $3 \%$ lower salary when compared with males (adjusted by rank, step, series, doctorate, and other variables). An imbalance of $Z$ payments (for clinical incentives) was also revealed with females receiving $29 \%$ lower payments than males.
- URMs: No imbalance was detected for underrepresented minorities.

In response, the School formed a committee in 2015 and conducted a gender equity analysis of School of Pharmacy faculty salaries to determine if any imbalances exist at the School or department levels. Note that an URM analysis was not undertaken due the small number (4), of URM faculty in the school of pharmacy. Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Thomas Kearney, led this committee. Representatives from each Department were appointed to include: Sharon Youmans (Dept. of Clinical Pharmacy), Tanja Kortemme (Dept. of Bioengineering and Therapeutic Sciences), Zev Gartner (Dept. of Pharmaceutical Chemistry), and James Lightwood (to serve as the committee's statistician).

The 2015 SOP report was reviewed and approved by the Campus-level Faculty Salary Equity Committee with the conclusion that no gender inequities existed (all imbalances were explained by non-discriminatory and legitimate business practices).

The School-level committee proposed the following recommendations:

- The SOP should continue an annual faculty salary analysis to highlight trends and gender comparisons based on new faculty recruits, turnover and retention pressures for existing faculty, and impact on constraints and ability to acquire extramural grant funding.
- Each Department should continue to employ transparent and well-reasoned processes for determining negotiable faculty salary components.
- The Departments should strive for effective and fair criteria for accelerations in academic advancement, considering the impact on UCSF's competitiveness and our ability to recruit and retain our outstanding faculty.

On July $19^{\text {th }}$, the UCSF office of the Vice Provost of Academic Affairs requested a progress report on the schools' action plan from the previous faculty salary equity analysis. The goal for the 2016 analysis is to determine if there were any trends in salary comparisons by gender between 2015 and 2016, as well as faculty turnovers and academic advancements.

## Methods:

- The dataset of faculty salary data for the school of pharmacy was provided as an excel spreadsheet by the campus Office of Academic Affairs. It was segregated from the same dataset utilized by the campus-level review and included salary data as of July 1, 2016. Therefore, the inclusion and exclusion criteria, and analysis variables were maintained. Accelerations were defined as any merit or promotion action during the 2013-2014 and 20142015 academic years. The dataset was updated by the SOP Academic Affairs office to include the $1.5 \%$ range adjustments for the HSCP as per the UC system-wide 2016-2017 salary program, reconciled salaries with payroll, Z payments, and included all recently approved merits and re-negotiated salaries at the Department-level.
- In addition, the SOP Academic Affairs office compiled salary data as of July 1, 2015 to evaluate trends from the initial analysis of the 2014 salary dataset.
- The dataset was further segregated by department to provide an unadjusted analysis of salary and acceleration variables by gender. A packet review report was generated comparing faculty advancement, retirement, and resignations for 7/2/2013 to 7/1/2014 and 7/2/2014 to 7/1/2015.
- Due to the small sample sizes of URMs ( $\mathrm{n}=3$ ) and sub-groups (by varied series and ranks) of paid faculty, the analysis of URM faculty was performed by a matched pair comparison of faculty with similar co-variants to include series, rank, step, department and doctorate type.
- The school-level dataset was analyzed by an adjusted regression analysis of $X+Y$ salaries for differences between females and males.
- The Department-level datasets with salary data as of July 2015 were provided to each Department Chair and an explanatory response for any potential imbalances were received.
- The preliminary results were presented to the school of pharmacy Compensation Plan Advisory Committee for comment.

A presentation of the highlights of the analysis of the 2015 dataset and follow-up on the previous salary equity report and recommendations were presented at the June, 2016 meeting of the full faculty.

- The Dean's office of Academic Affairs analyzed and compared the trends between the datasets for 2015 and 2016. A report provided to the Dean with an executive summary.
- The report was presented, reviewed, and approved by the campus Faculty Salary Equity Review Steering Committee.


## Executive Summary:

Conclusion: There were no statistically significant differences by gender in faculty salaries for the school of pharmacy based on a school-wide adjusted analysis on $X+Y$ pay. All gender imbalances (female and male-preferences) at the Department-level were explained by non-discriminatory legitimate business practices. There was sufficient justification for the basis of the negotiated $Y$ salaries for the URM faculty in the SOP. However, the school should strive for consistency in salary negotiations between Departments for faculty in similar series and emphasis (clinical or research). In addition, it is recommended that all faculty be apprised of leadership opportunities at the School and Department- level to optimize their academic advancement and equitable access to augmentary funding via $Z$ payments. The salary trajectories with rising ranks are distinct between clinical and research based faculty. Early career clinical pharmacy faculty receive augmented Y salaries to meet marketplace professional salary levels for practicing pharmacists in which the Y salary component diminishes with rising ranks as the X and X ' salary component reach parity with the market place. Research-based faculty Y salary tends to peak at the associate professor rank commensurate with their grantsmanship and tends to decline at the full professor rank.

Furthermore, the UC system-wide salary programs, that have been implemented by shifting $Y$ salary components to meet $X$ and $X^{\prime}$ requirements of the increased HSCP scale levels, have created a trend of a declining number of paid faculty with a $Y$ salary component. In addition, net salary increases were provided only to those faculty with no Y salary component, resulting in a potential inequity via the salary program. While all faculty received a higher level of covered compensation, this may be mitigated with the revised retirement program with a capitation on the salary level for UCRP benefits. Note that this analysis is limited by the small sample size often with 1 or 2 comparators by gender with sub-group analyses.

## Main findings at the School Level:

Median X \& Y: There were gender imbalances in faculty salaries for the school of pharmacy based on a school-wide unadjusted analysis on Median $\mathrm{X}+\mathrm{Y}$ pay which demonstrated a male preference at the full professor rank for the HS Clinical series and associate and full professor ranks in Ladder rank series. This was attributed to a comparator of 2 senior male faculty with a Y salary component augmenting their total $X \& Y$ salary levels based on their leadership positions and administrative responsibilities in the HS Clinical series. In addition at the full professor rank, the male cohort was associated with a large difference in average years since doctorate and higher steps at rank. There was a female preference at the associate professor rank in the HS Clinical series with a comparator of 1 in each group with the female faculty member receiving a higher Y salary to provide special contract work. There was also a female preference at the full professor rank in the In Residence series with small comparators ( 2 female faculty with 1 male comparator) and the female cohort had more years since doctorate and included a physician. All other series and ranks were closely balanced by gender with ratios ranging 0.98 to 1.08 . The trends were consistent with the previous year analysis.

Median Y: There were gender imbalances in faculty salaries for the school of pharmacy based on a school-wide unadjusted analysis on Median Y pay which demonstrated a male preference at the full
professor rank in the Clinical X series, the HS Clinical series, and in the In Residence series. It is noted that 3 male faculty at the full professor rank in the Clinical $X$ series received $Y$ salaries based administrative responsibilities (program directors) while the 2 other male faculty didn't receive a Y salary. The female comparators included $3 Y$ salaries that exceeded the male median and the Median $X$ \& $Y$ for this group was balanced by gender. In the HS Clinical series, the imbalance was attributed to a comparator of 2 senior male faculty with leadership positions and administrative responsibilities. At the full
professor rank in the In Residence series, there was only 1 male comparator to 2 female faculty. The male faculty is from a different Department (BTS) than the 2 female faculty (CP) and 1 of the female faculty members has a higher Y salary than the male and the Median X \& Y salary is imbalanced with a female preference for this group. There are female preferences at the associate professor rank for the Clinical $X$ and the HS Clinical series and at the assistant and full professor ranks for in the Ladder rank series. At the associate rank in the Clinical $X$ series, 2 of the male faculty (out of 3 total) had the same $Y$ salary as one of the female faculty (out of 2 total). The higher $Y$ salary for 1 female faculty member in this group is attributed to success as a clinician scientist and extramural funding, as well as retention. There was only one female and one male comparator in the HS Clinical series, and the female faculty was hired to perform special contract work. At the assistant rank in the Ladder rank series, there was only 1 comparator in the female cohort, while the male cohort came from 2 different departments in which $Y$ salaries are based on extramural grant funding and the Median X \& Y for this group was balanced by gender. At the professor rank in the Ladder rank series, female faculty were from 3 different departments with the predominance in one Department (6 out of 9 in BTS) and males split between 2 Departments (PC and BTS). The male cohort is represented by several A/S faculty whose Y salaries are lower commensurate with their extramural grant funding and the Median X \& Y was imbalanced with a male preference in this group.

Z payments: On a school-wide level, there was a more likely probability of women to receive a Z payment, which were exclusively provided for administrative stipends (Chair, Vice Dean, Associate Dean, Vice Chair, and Directors of Graduate Programs). Note that two Z payments were provided to faculty not subject to the School of Pharmacy Compensation plan, but via their ORU.

Accelerations: There was a male preference for accelerations in the Clinical $X$ series, while a female preference in the Ladder rank series. Note that future report cycles will reflect the new campus policy changes for criteria to base accelerations and CAP review requirements.

## Main findings at the Department Level:

- The Department of Bioengineering and Therapeutic Sciences (BTS) had higher male/female ratio in unadjusted Median $\mathrm{X}+\mathrm{Y}$ pay at the full professor rank, which is explained by a higher proportion of males with more years at rank (and higher step), as well as to accommodate the salary of a single male physician in the department. Females at the full professor rank had a higher Median Y pay based on the success of their research portfolios and, in one case, as a retention incentive. These factors may also explain a higher proportion of accelerations for females. Females at full professor rank also have higher occurrence of $Z$ payment for additional administrative duties for which they volunteered for. It was noted by the Department that a shift in hiring by gender has occurred- higher proportion of males to females following a trend of more females than males.
- The Department of Clinical Pharmacy (CP) had male-preference imbalances for unadjusted Median Y pay and Median X + Y pay for the HS Clinical Series, which was attributed to two male senior faculty in leadership positions associated with substantial administrative responsibilities. There was a female preference in Median $X+Y$ and $Y$ pay at the associate rank in the HS Clinical series which had only one comparator in each gender group and the female faculty was hired with special contract work. There was a female preference in Median $Y$ salary at the associate professor rank in the Clinical $X$ series salaries in which 2 of the male faculty (out of 3 total) had the same Y salary as one of the female faculty (out of 2 total). The higher Y salary for 1 female faculty member in this group is attributed to success as a clinician scientist and extramural funding, as well as retention. There was a male preference in Median Y salary at the full professor rank in the Clinical X series. It is noted that 3 male faculty at the full professor rank in
the Clinical $X$ series received $Y$ salaries based administrative responsibilities (program directors) while the 2 other male faculty didn't receive a Y salary. The female comparators included 3 Y salaries that exceeded the male median and the Median $X$ \& $Y$ for this group was balanced by gender. All other series and ranks were in close balance by gender. The Department noted that Y salary negotiations for recent hires are based on competitive marketplace salaries for clinical pharmacists and other performance measures- ability to bring in extramural funding and additional teaching and committee responsibilities.
- CP had a female-preference imbalance for the presence and Median amount of a $Z$ payment attributed to the leadership positions held by female faculty (Chair, Vice Dean, Associate Dean, and Vice Chair).
- The Department of Pharmaceutical Chemistry (PC) had male-preference imbalances for unadjusted Median $X+Y$ pay for Full and Associate Professor ranks in the Ladder Rank series, and unadjusted Median Y pay for Full Professor rank. There was a female preference for Median Y pay at the Associate professor rank in the In Residence series. The difference is attributed to ability to meet the Department's compensation goal for acquiring extramural grantbased revenue support. In addition, there is only one female comparator for the associate rank and two at the full professor rank in the Ladder rank series, and one female comparator in the In Residence series.
- PC had a female-preference imbalance for the Median amount of a Z. Z payments are provided for leadership positions held by faculty (Chair, Vice Dean, Vice Chair, Directors of Graduate programs). Note that the 2 highest $Z$ payments were made to males subject to a different Compensation Plan within their ORU.


## Results:

## Number of Paid Faculty

By department over past 3 academic years:

| Department | July 2014 | July 2015 | July 2016 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| BTS | 25 | 23 | 22 |
| CP | 41 | 40 | 40 |
| PC | 21 | 25 | 24 |
| Total | 87 | 88 | 86 |

## Academic Actions

|  | July 2013 - <br> July 2014 | July 2014 - <br> July 2015 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Merits | $\mathbf{2 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 9}$ |
| Accelerations | $\mathbf{6}$ | $\mathbf{8}$ |
| Promotions | $\mathbf{2}$ | $\mathbf{5}$ |
| Appointments | $\mathbf{6}$ | $\mathbf{5}$ |
| Resignations/Retirements | $\mathbf{4}$ | $\mathbf{5}$ |
| Total Faculty | $\mathbf{8 7}$ | $\mathbf{8 8}$ |

Adjusted Female/Male X + Y Pay Ratio-SOP stratified by Rank

|  | Ratio | Confidence Interval |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Assistant Professor | $\mathbf{1 . 0 5}$ | $\mathbf{( 0 . 2 5 , ~ 4 . 3 2 )}$ |
| Associate Professor | $\mathbf{1 . 0 4}$ | $\mathbf{( 0 . 9 3 , 1 . 1 7 )}$ |
| Full Professor | $\mathbf{1 . 0}$ | $\mathbf{( 0 . 9 4 , 1 . 0 6 )}$ |

Adjusted Female/Male X + Y Pay Ratio-SOP stratified by Department

|  | Ratio | Confidence <br> Interval |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Clinical Pharmacy | 1.0 | $(0.9,1.11)$ |
| BTS | 1.02 | $(0.79,1.31)$ |
| Pharm Chem | $\mathbf{0 . 8 4}$ | $(0.7,1.01)$ |

## UNADJUSTED SCHOOL-LEVEL ANALYSIS

Note: the left sided columns include data from July, 2016 and the right sided column includes comparative data from July 2015.

Tables 17-32: Gender status analyses: unadjusted campus-level median salary ( $\mathrm{X}+\mathrm{Y}$ ), presence of Z (proportion), median $Z$ payment, if present, and presence of acceleration (proportion) by gender and these values and their ratios by rank, doctorate type, and series.

Table 17. Unadjusted Median Salary X+Y (\$1,000s) by Gender Status

| SOP | July 2016 |  |  | July <br> 2016 |  | July 2015 | July <br> 2015 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Gender | Median X+Y | $\mathbf{N}$ | Median X+Y | $\mathbf{N}$ |  |  |  |
| Female | 160 | 39 | 150 | 39 |  |  |  |
| Male | 168 | 46 | 168 | 48 |  |  |  |

Table 17.1 Unadjusted Median Salary Y (\$ 1,000s) by Gender Status

| SOP | July 2016 |  |  | July <br> 2016 |  | July 2015 | July <br> 2015 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Gender | Median Y | $\mathbf{N}$ | Median Y | $\mathbf{N}$ |  |  |  |
| Female | 21 | 39 | 21 | 39 |  |  |  |
| Male | 27 | 46 | 26 | 48 |  |  |  |

Table 18. Unadjusted Presence of Z (Proportion) by Gender Status

|  |  |  | July |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| SOP | July 2016 | 2016 | July 2015 | 2015 |


| Gender | Presence of $\mathbf{Z}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ | Presence of $\mathbf{Z}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Female | 0.33 | 39 | 0.38 | 39 |
| Male | 0.22 | 46 | 0.29 | 48 |

Table 19. Unadjusted Median Z Pay (\$ 1,000s), if Present by Gender Status

| SOP | July 2016 |  |  | July <br> 2016 |  | July 2015 |  | July <br> 2015 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Gender | Median Z | N | Median Z | N |  |  |  |  |
| Female | 4 | 13 | 5 | 15 |  |  |  |  |
| Male | 4 | 10 | 5 | 14 |  |  |  |  |

Table 20. Unadjusted Presence of Acceleration (Proportion) by Gender Status

| SOP | July 2016 |  |  | July <br> 2016 |  | July 2015 | July <br> 2015 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Gender | Accel | $\mathbf{N}$ | Accel | $\mathbf{N}$ |  |  |  |
| Female | 0.08 | 78 | 0.08 | 78 |  |  |
| Male | 0.08 | 92 | 0.1 | 96 |  |  |  |

*Note: N represents two year's data for each faculty, thus is double the N of faculty for each analysis

Note that in the tables below, ratios less than 1 indicate a male preference and greater than 1 indicates a female preference.
Note that " 0 " indicates lack of a gender comparator.

Table 21. Unadjusted Median X+Y Pay (\$ 1,000s) and Pay Ratios by Gender by Rank

| SOP | $\mathbf{2 0 1 6}$ <br> Female |  | 2016 Male |  | $\mathbf{2 0 1 6}$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Female/Male | 2015 <br> Female/Male |  |  |  |  |  |
| Rank | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Ratio | Ratio |
| Assistant | 129 | 6 | 130 | 5 | 0.99 | 0.96 |
| Associate | 144 | 6 | 160 | 16 | 0.9 | 0.92 |
| Full | 175 | 27 | 202 | 25 | 0.87 | 0.87 |

Table 21.1 Unadjusted Median Y Pay (\$ 1,000s) and Pay Ratios by Gender by Rank

| SOP | 2016 <br> Female |  | 2016 Male |  | 2016 <br> Female/ Male | 2015 <br> Female/ Male |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Rank | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Ratio | Ratio |
| Assistant | 27 | 6 | 34 | 5 | 0.78 | 0.91 |
| Associate | 23 | 6 | 33 | 16 | 0.69 | 0.74 |
| Full | 6 | 27 | 21 | 25 | 0.31 | 0.46 |

Table 22. Unadjusted Presence of $\mathbf{Z}$ (Proportion) and Ratios by Gender by Rank

| SOP | $\mathbf{2 0 1 6}$ <br> Female |  | 2016 Male |  | $\mathbf{2 0 1 6}$ <br> Female/ Male | $\mathbf{2 0 1 5}$ <br> Female/ Male |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Rank | $\mathbf{Z}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ | $\mathbf{Z}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ | Ratio | Ratio |
| Assistant | 0 | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 |
| Associate | 0.33 | 6 | 0.13 | 16 | 2.67 | 2.27 |
| Full | 0.41 | 27 | 0.32 | 25 | 1.27 | 1.2 |

Table 23. Unadjusted Median Z (\$ 1,000s) and Pay Ratios, if Present, by Gender by Rank

| SOP | 2016 <br> Female |  | 2016 Male |  | 2016 <br> Female/ Male | 2015 <br> Female/ Male |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Rank | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Ratio | Ratio |
| Assistant |  | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Associate | 6 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2.89 | 3.75 |
| Full | 4 | 11 | 4 | 8 | 1 | 0.8 |

Table 24. Unadjusted Presence of Acceleration and Ratios by Gender by Rank

| SOP | $\begin{gathered} 2016 \\ \text { Female } \end{gathered}$ |  | 2016 Male |  | $\begin{gathered} 2016 \\ \text { Female/ Male } \end{gathered}$ | 2015 <br> Female/ Male <br> Ratio |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Rank | Accel | N | Accel | N | Ratio |  |
| Assistant | 0 | 13 | 0.08 | 13 | 0 | 0 |
| Associate | 0 | 11 | 0.07 | 30 | 0 | 0 |
| Full | 0.11 | 54 | 0.08 | 49 | 1.36 | 0.93 |

*Note: N represents two year's data for each faculty, thus is double the N of faculty for each analysis

Table 25. Unadjusted Median X+Y Pay (\$ 1,000s) and Pay Ratios by Gender by Doctorate Type

| SOP <br> Female |  | 2016 Male |  | 2016 <br> Female/ Male | 2015 <br> Female/ Male |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Doctorate <br> Type | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Ratio | Ratio |
| None | 176 | 1 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Research | 168 | 18 | 175 | 33 | 0.96 | 0.93 |
| Clinical | 151 | 19 | 146 | 11 | 1.03 | 1.05 |
| Both | 135 | 1 | 230 | 2 | 0.59 | 0.39 |

Table 25.1 Unadjusted Median Y Pay (\$ 1,000s) and Pay Ratios by Gender by Doctorate Type

| SOP <br> Female |  | 2016 Male |  | 2016 <br> Female/ Male | 2015 <br> Female/ Male |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Doctorate Type | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Ratio | Ratio |
| None | 25 | 1 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Research | 26 | 18 | 34 | 33 | 0.78 | 0.65 |
| Clinical | 16 | 19 | 14 | 11 | 1.08 | 0.96 |
| Both | 23 | 1 | 104 | 2 | 0.22 | 0.13 |

Table 26. Unadjusted Presence of Z (Proportion) and Ratios by Gender by Doctorate Type

| SOP | 2016 <br> Female |  | 2016 Male |  | 2016 <br> Female/ Male | 2015 <br> Female/ Male |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Doctorate <br> Type | $\mathbf{Z}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ | $\mathbf{Z}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ | Ratio | Ratio |
| None | 0 | 1 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Research | 0.33 | 18 | 0.18 | 33 | 1.83 | 1.68 |
| Clinical | 0.37 | 19 | 0.36 | 11 | 1.01 | 0.96 |
| Both | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 |

Table 27. Unadjusted Median Z Pay (\$ 1,000s) and Pay Ratios, if Present, by Gender by Doctorate Type

| SOP | $\mathbf{2 0 1 6}$ <br> Female |  | $\mathbf{2 0 1 6}$ <br> Male |  | 2016 <br> Female/ Male | 2015 <br> Female/ Male |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Doctorate <br> Type | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Ratio | Ratio |
| None |  | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Research | 8 | 6 | 4 | 6 | 2 | 0.45 |
| Clinical | 3 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 0.75 | 0.75 |
| Both |  | 0 |  |  | 0 | 0 |

Table 28. Unadjusted Presence of Acceleration (Proportion) and Pay Ratios by Gender by Doctorate Type

|  | $\mathbf{2 0 1 6}$ <br> Semale |  | $\mathbf{2 0 1 6}$ <br> Male |  | $\mathbf{2 0 1 6}$ <br> Female/ Male | 2015 <br> Female/ Male |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Doctorate <br> Type | Accel | $\mathbf{N}$ | Accel | $\mathbf{N}$ | Ratio | Ratio |
| None | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Research | 0.14 | 36 | 0.08 | 66 | 1.83 | 1.57 |
| Clinical | 0.03 | 38 | 0.05 | 22 | 0.58 | 0.23 |
| Both | 0 | 2 | 0.25 | 4 | 0 | 0 |

${ }^{*}$ Note: N represents two year's data for each faculty, thus is double the N of faculty for each analysis

Table 29. Unadjusted Median X+Y Pay (\$ 1,000s) and Pay Ratios by Gender by Series

| SOP | $\mathbf{2 0 1 6}$ <br> Female |  | 2016 <br> Male |  | $\mathbf{2 0 1 6}$ <br> Female/ Male | $\mathbf{2 0 1 5}$ <br> Female/ Male |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Series | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Ratio | Ratio |
| Adjunct | 151 | 4 | 139 | 3 | 1.09 | 1.07 |
| Clinical X | 151 | 13 | 141 | 9 | 1.07 | 1.06 |
| HS Clinical | 143 | 7 | 172 | 3 | 0.83 | 0.81 |
| In Residence | 184 | 4 | 161 | 6 | 1.14 | 1.14 |
| Ladder Rank | 195 | 11 | 190 | 25 | 1.02 | 1 |

Table 29.1 Unadjusted Median Y Pay (\$ 1,000s) and Pay Ratios by Gender by Series

| SOP | $\mathbf{2 0 1 6}$ <br> Female |  | 2016 <br> Male | 2016 <br> Female/ Male | 2015 <br> Female/ Male <br> Ratio | Ratio |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Series | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | 0 | 0 |
| Adjunct |  | 4 |  | 3 | 0 | 0.97 |
| Clinical X | 11 | 13 | 15 | 9 | 0.73 | 1.4 |
| HS Clinical | 22 | 7 | 14 | 3 | 1.56 | 1.06 |
| In Residence | 36 | 4 | 35 | 6 | 1.05 | 0.71 |
| Ladder Rank | 39 | 11 | 39 | 25 | 1 |  |

Table 30. Unadjusted Presence of Z (Proportion) and Ratios by Gender by Series

| SOP | 2016 <br> Female |  | 2016 Male |  | 2016 <br> Female/ Male | 2015 <br> Female/ Male <br> Ratio |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Series | $\mathbf{Z}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ | $\mathbf{Z}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ | Ratio | Ration |
| Adjunct | 0 | 4 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Clinical X | 0.54 | 13 | 0.11 | 9 | 4.85 | 2.69 |
| HS Clinical | 0 | 7 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| In <br> Residence | 0.25 | 4 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0.88 |
| Ladder <br> Rank | 0.45 | 11 | 0.24 | 25 | 1.89 | 2.27 |

Table 31. Unadjusted Median Z Pay (\$1,000s) and Pay Ratios, if Present, by Gender by Series

|  | 2016 <br> Semale |  | 2016 Male |  | 2016 <br> Female/ Male | 2015 <br> Female/ Male |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Series | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Ratio | Ratio |
| Adjunct |  | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Clinical X | 4 | 7 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1.33 |
| HS Clinical | 2 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 0.5 | 0 |
| In Residence |  | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0.06 |
| Ladder Rank | 10 | 5 | 4 | 6 | 2.67 | 0.64 |

Table 32. Unadjusted Presence of Acceleration (Proportion) and Ratios by Gender by Series

|  | 2016 <br> SOP |  |  | 2016 <br> Female | 2016 Male |  | 2015 <br> Female/ Male |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Series | Accel | $\mathbf{N}$ | Accel | $\mathbf{N}$ | Ratio | Ratio |  |
| Adjunct | 0 | 8 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 |  |
| Clinical X | 0.04 | 26 | 0.06 | 18 | 0.69 | 0.26 |  |
| HS Clinical | 0 | 14 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 |  |
| In <br> Residence | 0 | 8 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 0 |  |
| Ladder <br> Rank | 0.23 | 22 | 0.12 | 50 | 1.89 | 1.62 |  |

*Note: N represents two year's data for each faculty, thus is double the N of faculty for each analysis

Table 33 (SOP). Unadjusted Median Pay (\$1000s) and Pay Ratios by Gender by Series and Rank

| School of <br> Pharmacy (SOP) | 2016 Female |  |  |  | 2016 Male |  |  |  | 2016 <br> Female/Male <br> Ratio |  | 2015 <br> Female/Male <br> Ratio |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Series <br> Rank | Median $X+Y$ | Median Y | N | Average Years Since Doctorate | Median X+Y | Median Y | N | Average Years Since Doctorate | $\mathbf{X + Y} \quad \mathbf{Y}$ |  | X+Y | Y |
| Adjunct |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Assistant |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | 0 |  |
| Associate |  |  | 0 |  | 135 | 8 | 2 | 21 |  |  | 0 |  |
| Full | 151 |  | 4 | 27.5 | 151 |  | 1 | 27 | 1 |  | 1 | 0 |
| Clinical X |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Assistant | 124 | 21 | 2 | 6 | 124 | 23 | 1 | 13 | 1.01 | 0.91 | 1.07 | 0.92 |
| Associate | 133 | 19 | 2 | 11.5 | 132 | 15 | 3 | 13.33 | 1.01 | 1.29 | 0.97 | 0.76 |
| Full | 160 | 4 | 9 | 24.56 | 162 | 10 | 5 | 23.8 | 0.98 | 0.38 | 0.92 | 1.01 |
| HS Clinical |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Assistant | 130 | 28 | 3 | 12.33 |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | 0 | 0 |
| Associate | 153 | 22 | 1 | 24 | 135 | 12 | 1 | 31 | 1.14 | 1.93 | 1.08 | 1.81 |
| Full | 153 | 1 | 3 | 25.67 | 187 | 23 | 2 | 46 | 0.81 | 0.06 | 0.79 | 0.14 |
| In Residence |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Assistant |  |  | 0 |  | 130 | 25 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Associate | 160 | 37 | 2 | 16.5 | 161 | 36 | 3 | 15.33 | 0.99 | 1.05 | 0.97 | 0.88 |
| Full | 224 | 28 | 2 | 33 | 185 | 34 | 1 | 25 | 1.21 | 0.81 | 1.21 | 1.69 |
| Ladder Rank |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Assistant | 160 | 49 | 1 | 8 | 149 | 37 | 2 | 7.5 | 1.08 | 1.31 | 1 | 0.98 |
| Associate | 141 |  | 1 | 21 | 166 | 43 | 7 | 10 | 0.85 | 0 | 0.85 | 0.89 |
| Full | 206 | 39 | 9 | 25.78 | 261 | 33 | 16 | 30.25 | 0.79 | 1.17 | 0.75 | 0.73 |

Summary: Imbalances for adjunct associate, HS Clinical full, and ladder rank full are associated with large differences in the average years since doctorate (range of 10-20 years). Other series and rank imbalances are associated with small sample size comparators.

## Comparison of 2016 Faculty Salaries ( $\mathrm{X}+\mathrm{Y}$ ) by gender and rank and step

Salaries 2016


## UNADJUSTED DEPARTMENT-LEVEL ANALYSIS

Note that ratios less than 1 indicate a male preference and greater than indicate a female preference. Note that " 0 " indicates lack of a gender comparator.

Note that all names of faculty were redacted from the Department explanations.

## BIOENGINEERING \& THERAPEUTIC SCIENCES

Table 17. Unadjusted Median Salary X+Y (\$1,000s) by Gender Status

|  |  | July |  | July |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| BTS | July 2016 | 2016 | July 2015 | 2015 |


| Gender | Median X+Y | $\mathbf{N}$ | Median X+Y | $\mathbf{N}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Female | 209 | 8 | 202 | 8 |
| Male | 180 | 14 | 171 | 15 |

Table 17.1 Unadjusted Median Salary Y (\$ 1,000s) by Gender Status

|  |  |  | July |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| BTS | July 2016 | 2016 | July 2015 | 2015 |


| Gender | Median $\mathbf{Y}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ | Median $\mathbf{Y}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Female | 44 | 8 | 30 | 8 |
| Male | 34 | 14 | 31 | 15 |

Table 18. Unadjusted Presence of $Z$ (Proportion) by Gender Status

|  |  |  | July |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| BTS | July 2016 | 2016 | July 2015 | 2015 |


| Gender | Presence of <br> $\mathbf{Z}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ | Presence of <br> $\mathbf{Z}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Female | 0.5 | 8 | 0.63 | 8 |
| Male | 0.14 | 14 | 0.13 | 15 |

Table 19. Unadjusted Median Z Pay (\$ 1,000s), if Present by Gender Status

|  |  | July |  | July |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| BTS | July 2016 | 2016 | July 2015 | 2015 |


| Gender | Median Z | N | Median Z | N |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Female | 13 | 4 | 15 | 5 |
| Male | 11 | 2 | 19 | 2 |

Table 20. Unadjusted Presence of Acceleration (Proportion) by Gender Status

|  |  | July |  | July |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| BTS | July 2016 | 2016 | July 2015 | 2015 |


| Gender | Accel | $\mathbf{N}$ | Accel | N |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Female | 0.31 | 16 | 0.31 | 16 |
| Male | 0.14 | 28 | 0.17 | 30 |

*Note: N represents two year's data for each faculty, thus is double the N of faculty for each analysis

Table 21. Unadjusted Median X+Y Pay (\$ 1,000s) and Pay Ratios by Gender by Rank


2015 EXPLANATION: FULL: BTS has a number of senior male Full Professors with high X salary components whereas, as a group, the female Full Professors have less years of tenure and thus lower X salaries.
2016 EXPLANATION: FULL: BTS has a number of senior male Full Professors with high X salary components whereas, as a group, the female Full Professors have less years of tenure and thus lower X salaries.

Table 21.1 Unadjusted Median Y Pay (\$ 1,000s) and Pay Ratios by Gender by Rank

| BTS | 2016 <br> Female |  | 2016 Male |  | $2016$ <br> Female/ Male | $2015$ <br> Female/ <br> Male |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Rank | Median | N | Median | N | Ratio | Ratio |
| Assistant | 49 | 1 | 34 | 1 | 1.44 | 0.91 |
| Associate |  | 0 | 43 | 5 | 0 | 0 |
| Full | 44 | 7 | 27 | 8 | 1.61 | 1.24 |

2015 EXPLANATION: BTS has two male Full Professors with no Y salary components based on their relatively small research portfolios. Additionally, one female Full Professor has a large Y component due to a retention offer.

2016 EXPLANATION: BTS has two male Full Professors with no Y salary components based on their small research portfolios. Additionally, one female Full Professor has a large $Y$ component due to a retention offer.

Table 22. Unadjusted Presence of Z (Proportion) and Ratios by Gender by Rank

|  |  |  |  | 2016 | 2015 |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| BTS | 2016 <br> Female |  |  |  | Female/ <br> Male | Female/ <br> Male |
| Rank | $\mathbf{Z}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ | $\mathbf{Z}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ | Ratio | Ratio |
| Assistant | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Associate | 0 | 0 | 0.2 | 5 | 0 | 0 |
| Full | 0.57 | 7 | 0.13 | 8 | 4.57 | 2.86 |

2015 EXPLANATION: BTS makes Z payments to the PIs in return for the PIs assuming additional roles and responsibilities. Proportionally more female Full Professors than male Full Professors have volunteered for, and been selected to take on, these additional duties (e.g. Chair, Vice Chair, Program Director for Graduate Programs).

2016 EXPLANATION: BTS makes Z payments to the PIs in return for the Pls assuming additional roles and responsibilities. Proportionally more female Full Professors than male Full Professors have volunteered for, and been selected to take on, these additional duties (e.g. Chair, Vice Chair, Program Director for Graduate Programs).

Table 23. Unadjusted Median Z (\$ 1,000s) and Pay Ratios, if Present, by Gender by Rank

| BTS | $2016$ <br> Female |  | 2016 Male |  | $2016$ <br> Female/ Male | $2015$ <br> Female/ Male |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Rank | Median | N | Median | N | Ratio | Ratio |
| Assistant |  | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Associate |  | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Full | 13 | 4 | 19 | 1 | 0.66 | 0.79 |

2015 EXPLANATION: BTS makes Z payments to the PIs in return for the Pls assuming additional roles and responsibilities. Proportionally more female Full Professors than male Full Professors have volunteered for, and been selected to take on, these additional duties (e.g. Chair, Vice Chair, Program Director for Graduate Programs).

2016 EXPLANATION: BTS makes Z payments to the PIs in return for the Pls assuming additional roles and responsibilities (e.g. Chair, Vice Chair, and Program Director for Graduate Programs). Proportionally more female Professors than male Professors act as Program Directors which pay a lower $Z$ amount than for other roles. Additionally, the two males receiving $Z$ payments serve in two different roles and thus receive two different $Z$ payments which the analysis treats as 1 .

Table 24. Unadjusted Presence of Acceleration and Ratios by Gender by Rank

|  | 2016 <br>  <br> BTS |  |  | 2016 | 2015 <br> Female |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Accel | $\mathbf{N}$ | Accel | $\mathbf{N}$ | Ratio | Male | Female/ <br> Male <br> Ratio |
| Assistant | 0 | 2 | 0.2 | 5 | 0 | 0 |
| Associate | 0 | 0 | 0.13 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
| Full | 0.36 | 14 | 0.13 | 15 | 2.68 | 2.86 |

*Note: N represents two year's data for each faculty, thus is double the N of faculty for each analysis.

2015 EXPLANATION: These proportions are sufficiently close and do not require an explanation.

2016 EXPLANATION: In 2014 \& 2015 a concentrated effort was made to move the female full professors more quickly up the steps given their successful careers.

Table 25. Unadjusted Median X+Y Pay (\$ 1,000s) and Pay Ratios by Gender by Doctorate Type

| 2016 <br> BTS |  |  | 2016 <br> Female/ <br> Male | Female/ <br> Male |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Doctorate <br> Type | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Ratio | Ratio |
| None |  | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Research | 209 | 8 | 175 | 13 | 1.19 | 1.18 |
| Clinical |  | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Both |  | 0 | 336 | 1 | 0 | 0 |

2015 EXPLANATION: The vast majority of the female professors in BTS are Full Professors and thus have higher salaries.

2016 EXPLANATION: The vast majority of the female professors in BTS are Full Professors and thus have higher salaries than the male professors who are more evenly spread across the different ranks.

Table 25.1 Unadjusted Median Y Pay (\$ 1,000s) and Pay Ratios by Gender by Doctorate Type

| BTS | $2016$ <br> Female |  | 2016 Male |  | $2016$ <br> Female/ Male | $2015$ <br> Female/ Male |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Doctorate Type | Median | N | Median | N | Ratio | Ratio |
| None |  | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Research | 44 | 8 | 34 | 13 | 1.29 | 1.02 |
| Clinical |  | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Both |  | 0 | 185 | 1 | 0 | 0 |

2015 EXPLANATION: The female professors have less years of tenure than the males and thus lower X components. They also tend to have large research portfolios. The combination then leads to reasons for them to have higher Y components of their salaries.

2016 EXPLANATION: The tranche of young male professors have reached the point in their careers where an increase in $Y$ is required to bring them closer to market rates - much the same as had been experienced with the slighter more experienced tranche of female professors.

Table 26. Unadjusted Presence of Z (Proportion) and Ratios by Gender by Doctorate Type

|  | 2016 |  |  |  | $\mathbf{2 0 1 6}$ <br> Female/ <br> MTS | 2015 <br> Male |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Female/ <br> Male |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Doctorate Type | $\mathbf{Z}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ | $\mathbf{Z}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ | $\mathbf{R a t i o}$ | Ratio |
| None | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Research | 0.5 | 8 | 0.15 | 13 | 3.25 | 4.38 |
| Clinical | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Both | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |

2015 EXPLANATION: BTS makes Z payments to the PIs in return for the Pls assuming additional roles and responsibilities. Proportionally more female Full Professors than male Full Professors have volunteered for, and been selected to take on, these additional duties (e.g. Chair, Vice Chair, Program Director for Graduate Programs).

2016 EXPLANATION: BTS makes $Z$ payments to the PIs in return for the Pls assuming additional roles and responsibilities. Proportionally more female Full Professors than male Full Professors have volunteered for, and been selected to take on, these additional duties (e.g. Chair, Vice Chair, Program Director for Graduate Programs).

Table 27. Unadjusted Median Z Pay (\$ 1,000s) and Pay Ratios, if Present, by Gender by Doctorate Type

|  | 2016 <br>  <br> BTS |  |  |  | 2016 <br> Female/ <br> Male | 2015 <br> Female/ <br> Male |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Doctorate <br> Type | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Ratio | Ratio |
| None |  | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Research | 13 | 4 | 11 | 2 | 1.16 | 0.79 |
| Clinical | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Both |  | 0 |  |  | 0 | 0 |

2015 EXPLANATION: Over 25\% of the total $Z$ payments made are in context of the Chair's stipend (the largest stipend paid by far) and the Chair happens to be female.

2016 EXPLANATION: BTS makes $Z$ payments to the PIs in return for the Pls assuming additional roles and responsibilities (e.g. Chair, Vice Chair, and Program Director for Graduate Programs). Proportionally more female Professors than male Professors act as Program Directors which pay a lower Z amount than for other roles. Additionally, the two males receiving $Z$ payments serve in two different roles and thus receive two different $Z$ payments which the analysis treats as 1 .

Table 28. Unadjusted Presence of Acceleration (Proportion) and Pay Ratios by Gender by Doctorate Type

|  | 2016 <br> BTS |  |  |  | 2016 <br> Female/ <br> Male | 2015 <br> Female/ <br> Male |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Doctorate <br> Type | Accel | $\mathbf{N}$ | Accel | $\mathbf{N}$ | Ratio | Ratio |
| None | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Research | 0.31 | 16 | 0.12 | 26 | 2.71 | 2.19 |
| Clinical | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Both | 0 | 0 | 0.5 | 2 | 0 | 0 |

*Note: N represents two year's data for each faculty, thus is double the N of faculty for each analysis
2015 EXPLANATION: Over time the proportion of female professor hired vs. male has shifted from more male, to more female to more male. Over the 2 years in question, the careers of the "more female" tranche of professors hit the point that accelerated promotions could be expected in response to rapid career growth which was the case (both career growth and accelerations). In the relatively near future, the proportion of males with accelerations could well go up. Over a longer time period this ratio is likely to become closer 1.0.

2016 EXPLANATION: Over time the proportion of female professor hired vs. male has shifted from more male, to more female and back to more male. Over the time period in question, the careers of the "more female" tranche of professors hit the point that accelerated promotions could be expected in response to rapid career growth - which was the case (both career growth and accelerations). In the relatively near future, the proportion of males with accelerations could well go up. Over a longer time period this ratio is likely to become closer 1.0.

Table 29. Unadjusted Median X+Y Pay (\$ 1,000s) and Pay Ratios by Gender by Series

| BTS | $2016$ <br> Female |  | 2016 Male |  |  | 2015 <br> Female/ Male |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Series | Median | N | Median | N | Ratio | Ratio |
| Adjunct | 142 | 1 | 139 | 1 | 1.02 | 0.96 |
| Clinical X |  | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| HS Clinical |  | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| In Residence |  | 0 | 185 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Ladder Rank | 212 | 7 | 183 | 12 | 1.16 | 1.18 |

2015 EXPLANATION: Addressing only the Ladder Rank \%s. BTS has two clusters of male professors; those who are Full Professors with significant tenure, the other predominantly Assistant Professors with substantially
less tenure. The female professors on the other hand tend to cluster more closely together at the Full Professor level. Thus the Median for the male group is lower than that for the female group.

2016 EXPLANATION: Addressing only the Ladder Rank \%s. BTS has two clusters of male professors; those who are Full Professors with significant tenure, the other group with substantially less tenure. The female professors on the other hand tend to cluster more closely together at the Full Professor level. Thus the Median for the male group is lower than that for the female group.

Table 29.1 Unadjusted Median Y Pay (\$ 1,000s) and Pay Ratios by Gender by Series


2015 EXPLANATION: ADJUNCT: Only one data point for each gender. The Male professor has a lower X and a larger lab, hence the reason the Y is higher. LADDER: The female professors have less years of tenure than the males and thus lower X components. They also tend to have large research portfolios. The combination then leads to reasons for them to have higher Y components of their salaries.

2016 EXPLANATION: ADJUNCT: Only one data point for each gender. While the size of lab justification from last year no longer holds, Y's don't adjust quickly downward. LADDER: The two populations have very similar median Ys.

Table 30. Unadjusted Presence of Z (Proportion) and Ratios by Gender by Series

| BTS | 2016 Female |  | 2016 Male |  | $2016$ <br> Female/ Male | $2015$ <br> Female/ Male |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Series | Z | N | Z | N | Ratio | Ratio |
| Adjunct | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Clinical X | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| HS Clinical | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| In Residence | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Ladder Rank | 0.57 | 7 | 0.17 | 12 | 3.43 | 4.29 |

2015 EXPLANATION: BTS makes $Z$ payments to the Pls in return for the Pls assuming additional roles and responsibilities. Proportionally more female Professors than male Professors have volunteered for, and been selected to take on, these additional duties (e.g. Chair, Vice Chair, Program Director for Graduate Programs).

2016 EXPLANATION: BTS makes $Z$ payments to the PIs in return for the Pls assuming additional roles and responsibilities. Proportionally more female Professors than male Professors have volunteered for, and been selected to take on, these additional duties (e.g. Chair, Vice Chair, Program Director for Graduate Programs).

Table 31. Unadjusted Median Z Pay ( $\$ \mathbf{1 , 0 0 0} \mathbf{s}$ ) and Pay Ratios, if Present, by Gender by Series

|  | BTS |  |  |  | 2016 <br> Female/ <br> Male |  | 2015 <br> Female/ <br> Male |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Series | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Ratio | Ratio |  |
| Adjunct |  | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |
| Clinical X |  | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |
| HS Clinical |  | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |
| In Residence |  | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |
| Ladder Rank | 13 | 4 | 11 | 2 | 1.16 | 0.79 |  |

2015 EXPLANATION: BTS makes $Z$ payments to the PIs in return for the Pls assuming additional roles and responsibilities. Proportionally more female Professors than male Professors have volunteered for, and been selected to take on, these additional duties (e.g. Chair, Vice Chair, Program Director for Graduate Programs).

2016 EXPLANATION: BTS makes Z payments to the PIs in return for the Pls assuming additional roles and responsibilities (e.g. Chair, Vice Chair, and Program Director for Graduate Programs). Proportionally more female Professors than male Professors act as Program Directors which pay a lower $Z$ amount than for other roles. Additionally, the two males receiving $Z$ payments serve in two different roles and thus receive two different $Z$ payments which the analysis treats as 1 .

Table 32. Unadjusted Presence of Acceleration (Proportion) and Ratios by Gender by Series

|  | 2016 |  |  |  | 2016 <br> Female/ <br> BTS | 2015 <br> Male |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Female |  | Female/ <br> Male |  |  |  |  |
| Series | Accel | $\mathbf{N}$ | Accel | $\mathbf{N}$ | Ratio | Ratio |
| Adjunct | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Clinical X | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| HS Clinical | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| In Residence | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Ladder Rank | 0.36 | 14 | 0.17 | 24 | 2.14 | 1.71 |

*Note: N represents two year's data for each faculty, thus is double the N of faculty for each analysis
2015 EXPLANATION: Over time the proportion of female professor hired vs. male has shifted from more male, to more female to more male. Over the 2 years in question, the careers of the "more female" tranche of professors hit the point that accelerated promotions could be expected in response to rapid career growth which was the case (both career growth and accelerations). This has led to a corresponding increase in accelerated promotions for this group. Over a longer time period this ratio is likely to become closer 1.0.

2016 EXPLANATION: Over time the proportion of female professor hired vs. male has shifted from more male, to more female to more male. Over the 2 years in question, the careers of the "more female" tranche of professors hit the point that accelerated promotions could be expected in response to rapid career growth which was the case (both career growth and accelerations). This has led to a corresponding increase in accelerated promotions for this group. Over a longer time period this ratio is likely to become closer 1.0.

Table 33 (BTS). Unadjusted Median Pay (\$1,000s) and Pay Ratios by Gender by Series and Rank

|  <br> Therapeutic <br> Sciences (BTS) | 2016 Female |  |  |  | 2016 Male |  |  |  | 2016 <br> Female/Male <br> Ratio |  | $2015$ <br> Female/Male Ratio |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Series <br> Rank | Median $\mathbf{X + Y}$ | Median Y | N | Average Years Since Doctorate | Median $X+Y$ | Median Y | N | Average Years Since Doctorate | X+Y | Y | X+Y | Y |
| Adjunct |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Assistant |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | - | - |
| Associate |  |  | 0 |  | 139 | 16 | 1 | 20 |  |  | - | - |
| Full | 142 | 1 | 1 | 19 |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | - | - |
| Clinical X |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Assistant |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | - | 0 |
| Associate |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | - | 0 |
| Full |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | - | 0 |
| HS Clinical |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Assistant |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | 0 | 0 |
| Associate |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | 0 | 0 |
| Full |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | 0 | 0 |
| In Residence |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Assistant |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | 0 | 0 |
| Associate |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | 0 | 0 |
| Full |  |  | 0 |  | 185 | 34 | 1 |  |  |  | 0 | 0 |
| Ladder Rank |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Assistant | 160 | 49 | 1 | 8 | 140 | 34 | 1 | 6 | 1.14 | 1.44 | 1 | 0.91 |
| Associate | 141 |  | 1 | 21 | 168 | 54 | 4 | 8.5 | 0.84 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Full | 215 | 44 | 6 | 24.67 | 263 | 21 | 7 | 29.57 | 0.82 | 2.14 | 0.72 | 1.22 |

2015 EXPLANATION: BTS has a number of senior male Full Professors with high $X$ salary components whereas, as a group, the female professors have less years of tenure and thus lower $X$ salaries.

## DEPARTMENT OF CLINICAL PHARMACY (CP)

Table 17. Unadjusted Median Salary X+Y (\$ 1,000s) by Gender Status CP July 2016 July 2016 July 2015 July 2015

| Gender | Median X+Y | $\mathbf{N}$ | Median X+Y | $\mathbf{N}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Female | 152 | 26 | 149 | 26 |
| Male | 141 | 13 | 141 | 14 |

Table 17.1 Unadjusted Median Salary Y (\$ 1,000s) by Gender Status CP July 2016 July 2016 July 2015 July 2015

| Gender | Median Y | $\mathbf{N}$ | Median $\mathbf{Y}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Female | 13 | 26 | 13 | 26 |
| Male | 14 | 13 | 14 | 14 |

Table 18. Unadjusted Presence of $Z$ (Proportion) by Gender Status
CP July 2016 July 2016 July 2015 July 2015

| Gender | Presence of <br> $\mathbf{Z}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ | Presence of <br> $\mathbf{Z}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Female | 0.31 | 26 | 0.31 | 26 |
| Male | 0.31 | 13 | 0.36 | 14 |

Table 19. Unadjusted Median Z Pay (\$1,000s), if Present by Gender Status
CP July 2016 July 2016 July 2015 July 2015

| Gender | Median Z | $\mathbf{N}$ | Median Z | N |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Female | 3 | 8 | 4 | 8 |
| Male | 4 | 4 | 4 | 5 |

Table 20. Unadjusted Presence of Acceleration (Proportion) by Gender Status
CP July 2016 July 2016 July 2015 July 2015

| Gender | Accel | $\mathbf{N}$ | Accel | $\mathbf{N}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Female | 0.02 | 52 | 0.02 | 52 |
| Male | 0.04 | 26 | 0.11 | 28 |

*Note: N represents two year's data for each faculty, thus is double the N of faculty for each analysis

Table 21. Unadjusted Median X+Y Pay (\$ 1,000s) and Pay Ratios by Gender by Rank


Table 21.1 Unadjusted Median Y Pay (\$ 1,000s) and Pay Ratios by Gender by Rank

|  |  |  |  |  | $\mathbf{2 0 1 6}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 5}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathbf{C P}$ | 2016 <br> Female |  | 2016 <br> Male |  | Female/ <br> Male | Female/ <br> Male |
| Rank | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Ratio |  |
| Assistant | 25 | 5 | 23 | 1 | 1.07 | 1 |
| Associate | 23 | 4 | 12 | 5 | 1.96 | 1.76 |
| Full | 4 | 17 | 14 | 7 | 0.27 | 0.49 |

Table 22. Unadjusted Presence of $\mathbf{Z}$ (Proportion) and Ratios by Gender by Rank

|  | 2016 |  |  |  | $\mathbf{2 0 1 6}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 5}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| CP | 2016 |  | Female/ <br> Male | Female/ <br> Male |  |  |
| Rank | $\mathbf{Z}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ | $\mathbf{Z}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ | Ratio | Ratio |
| Assistant | 0 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Associate | 0.25 | 4 | 0.2 | 5 | 1.25 | 1.67 |
| Full | 0.41 | 17 | 0.43 | 7 | 0.96 | 0.82 |

Table 23. Unadjusted Median Z (\$ 1,000s) and Pay Ratios, if Present, by Gender by Rank

|  |  |  |  |  | 2016 | $\mathbf{2 0 1 5}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| CP | 2016 <br> Female |  | 2016 <br> Male |  | Female/ <br> Male | Female/ <br> Male |
| Rank | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Ratio |  |
| Assistant |  | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Associate | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Full | 4 | 7 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 1 |

Table 24. Unadjusted Presence of Acceleration and Ratios by Gender by Rank

|  | 2016 |  |  |  | 2016 | $\mathbf{2 0 1 5}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| CP | Female |  | 2016 <br> Male |  | Female/ <br> Male | Female/ <br> Male |
| Rank | Accel | $\mathbf{N}$ | Accel | $\mathbf{N}$ | Ratio |  |
| Assistant | 0 | 11 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Associate | 0 | 7 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 0 |
| Full | 0.03 | 34 | 0.07 | 14 | 0.41 | 0.16 |

*Note: N represents two year's data for each faculty, thus is double the N of faculty for each analysis

Table 25. Unadjusted Median X+Y Pay (\$ 1,000s) and Pay Ratios by Gender by Doctorate Type

|  |  |  |  | 2016 | 2015 |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| CP | 2016 <br> Female |  | Male <br> Memale/ <br> Male | Female/ <br> Male |  |  |
| Doctorate <br> Type | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Ratio | Ratio |
| None | 176 | 1 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Research | 155 | 5 | 131 | 1 | 1.19 | 1.16 |
| Clinical | 151 | 19 | 146 | 11 | 1.03 | 1.05 |
| Both | 135 | 1 | 124 | 1 | 1.09 | 0 |

Table 25.1 Unadjusted Median Y Pay (\$1,000s) and Pay Ratios by Gender by Doctorate Type

|  | CP |  |  |  | 2016 <br> 2016 <br> Female/ |  | 2015 <br> Male |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Doctorate Type | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Matio <br> Male |  |  |
| None | 25 | 1 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |
| Research | 4 | 5 |  | 1 | 0 | 0 |  |
| Clinical | 16 | 19 | 14 | 11 | 1.08 | 0.96 |  |
| Both | 23 | 1 | 23 | 1 | 1 | 0 |  |

Table 26. Unadjusted Presence of Z (Proportion) and Ratios by Gender by Doctorate Type

|  |  |  |  | 2016 | 2015 <br> CP | Female/ <br> Male | Female/ <br> Male |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Doctorate <br> Type | $\mathbf{Z}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ | $\mathbf{Z}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ | Ratio | Ratio |  |
| None | 0 | 1 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |
| Research | 0.2 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |  |
| Clinical | 0.37 | 19 | 0.36 | 11 | 1.01 | 0.96 |  |
| Both | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |  |

Table 27. Unadjusted Median Z Pay (\$ 1,000s) and Pay Ratios, if Present, by Gender by Doctorate Type

| CP | $2016$ <br> Female |  | 2016 <br> Male |  | 2016 Female/ Male <br> Ratio | 2015 Female/ Male <br> Ratio |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Doctorate Type | Median | N | Median | N |  |  |
| None |  | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Research | 4 | 1 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Clinical | 3 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 0.75 | 0.75 |
| Both |  | 0 |  |  | 0 | 0 |

Table 28. Unadjusted Presence of Acceleration (Proportion) and Pay Ratios by Gender by Doctorate Type

| CP | $2016$ <br> Female |  | $\begin{aligned} & 2016 \\ & \text { Male } \end{aligned}$ |  | 2016 <br> Female/ Male | 2015 Female/ Male |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Doctorate Type | Accel | N | Accel | N | Ratio | Ratio |
| None | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Research | 0 | 10 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Clinical | 0.03 | 38 | 0.05 | 22 | 0.58 | 0.23 |
| Both | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 |

*Note: N represents two year's data for each faculty, thus is double the N of faculty for each analysis

Table 29. Unadjusted Median X+Y Pay (\$1,000s) and Pay Ratios by Gender by Series

|  |  |  |  |  | 2016 | 2015 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| CP | 2016 <br> Female |  | 2016 <br> Male |  | Female/ <br> Male <br> Reries | Memale/ <br> Male <br> Ratio |
| Adjunct | 164 | 2 | 131 | 1 | 1.25 | 1.26 |
| Clinical X | 151 | 13 | 141 | 9 | 1.07 | 1.06 |
| HS Clinical | 143 | 7 | 172 | 3 | 0.83 | 0.81 |
| In Residence | 194 | 3 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Ladder Rank | 195 | 1 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Table 29.1 Unadjusted Median Y Pay (\$ 1,000s) and Pay Ratios by Gender by Series

|  |  |  |  | 2016 | 2015 |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| CP | 2016 <br> Female |  | 2016 <br> Male |  | Female/ <br> Male | Female/ <br> Male <br> Reries | Median |
| Adjunct | 13 | $\mathbf{N}$ | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Ratio |  |  |
| Clinical X | 11 | 13 | 15 | 9 | 0.73 | 0.97 |  |
| HS Clinical | 22 | 7 | 14 | 3 | 1.56 | 1.4 |  |
| In Residence | 23 | 3 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |
| Ladder Rank | 6 | 1 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |

Table 30. Unadjusted Presence of Z (Proportion) and Ratios by Gender by Series

|  |  |  |  |  | $\mathbf{2 0 1 6}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 5}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathbf{C P}$ | 2016 <br> Female |  | 2016 <br> Male |  | Female/ <br> Male | Female/ <br> Male |
| Series | $\mathbf{Z}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ | $\mathbf{Z}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ | Ratio | Ratio |
| Adjunct | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Clinical $\mathbf{X}$ | 0.54 | 13 | 0.11 | 9 | 4.85 | 2.69 |
| HS Clinical | 0 | 7 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| In Residence | 0.33 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Ladder Rank | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Table 31. Unadjusted Median Z Pay (\$1,000s) and Pay Ratios, if Present, by Gender by Series

| CP | 2016 <br> Female |  | 2016 <br> Male |  | 2016 <br> Female/ Male | $2015$ <br> Female/ Male |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Series | Median | N | Median | N | Ratio | Ratio |
| Adjunct |  | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Clinical X | 4 | 7 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1.33 |
| HS Clinical | 2 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 0.5 | 0 |
| In Residence |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |
| Ladder Rank |  | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Table 32. Unadjusted Presence of Acceleration (Proportion) and Ratios by Gender by Series

\left.|  | CP |  |  |  | 2016 | 2015 |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2016 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Series | Accel | N | Accel | N | Ratio | Female/ | Female/ |
| Male |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Male |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Rale |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |$\right]$

*Note: N represents two year's data for each faculty, thus is double the N of faculty for each analysis

Table 33 (CP). Unadjusted Median Pay (\$1,000s) and Pay Ratios by Gender by Series and Rank

| Clinical Pharmacy (CP) | 2016 Female |  |  |  | 2016 Male |  |  |  | 2016 <br> Female/Male <br> Ratio |  | 2015 <br> Female/Male Ratio |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Series <br> Rank <br> Adjunt | Median $X+Y$ | Median Y | N | Average Years Since Doctorate | Median $X+Y$ | Median Y | N | Average Years Since Doctorate | X+Y | Y | X+Y | Y |
| Adjunct |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Assistant |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | 0 | 0 |
| Associate |  |  | 0 |  | 131 |  | 1 | 22 |  |  | 0 | 0 |
| Full | 164 | 13 | 2 | 30.5 |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | 0 | 0 |
| Clinical X |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Assistant | 124 | 21 | 2 | 6 | 124 | 23 | 1 | 13 | 1.01 | 0.91 | 1.07 | 0.92 |
| Associate | 133 | 19 | 2 | 11.5 | 132 | 15 | 3 | 13.33 | 1.01 | 1.29 | 0.97 | 0.76 |
| Full | 160 | 4 | 9 | 24.56 | 162 | 10 | 5 | 23.8 | 0.98 | 0.38 | 0.92 | 1.01 |
| HS Clinical |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Assistant | 130 | 28 | 3 | 12.33 |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | 0 | 0 |
| Associate | 153 | 22 | 1 | 24 | 135 | 12 | 1 | 31 | 1.14 | 1.93 | 1.08 | 1.81 |
| Full | 153 | 1 | 3 | 25.67 | 187 | 23 | 2 | 46 | 0.81 | 0.06 | 0.79 | 0.14 |
| In Residence |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Assistant |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | 0 | 0 |
| Associate | 146 | 23 | 1 | 14 |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | 0 | 0 |
| Full | 224 | 28 | 2 | 33 |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | 0 | 0 |
| Ladder Rank |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Assistant |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | 0 | 0 |
| Associate |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | 0 | 0 |
| Full | 195 | 6 | 1 | 25 |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | 0 | 0 |

## 2015 Department of Clinical Pharmacy (CP) Explanation:

There is a slight imbalance (both in favor of female and male depending on the rank and series) in the y-factor is noted. An important piece to keep in mind is that the sample sizes in some of the drill downs are very small (e.g., for the adjunct faculty, I currently have 3-one of the adjunct faculty is retiring June 2015). What the yfactor analysis reflects is that more recent hires in CP have a larger yfactor. This has been done in order to stay somewhat competitive with other entities (e.g., Kaiser) in order to recruit junior faculty. Another key factor that significantly plays into a faculty member's yfactor is their performance (e.g., ability to bring in extramural funding or provide significant service to the department in other ways such as committee work and teaching).

In reviewing the $y$-factors, (Table 29.1), for adjunct faculty, an imbalance for females is shown; one faculty member came to the Department from the School of Medicine-her y-factor has reduced over the years. For the HS clinical faculty, an imbalance for males is noted; this is reflective that of the 9 HS clinical faculty, 2 of the senior HS faculty are men in leadership positions. For the Clin X faculty, there is a slight male preference. This is reflective of our more recent hires (including those now at the Associate level). Finally, in the research series (table 25), an imbalance for females is noted; this is a faculty member in the In Residence series who is a physician (who came to us from the School of Medicine), and therefore has a higher y-factor.
In reviewing the z-payments (tables $30 \& 31$ ), there is an imbalance to women. This reflects the female faculty in the department who hold leadership positions (Vice Chairs, Associate Deans, Vice Dean and Chair) and have administrative stipends.

## 2016 Department of Clinical Pharmacy (CP) Explanation:

Overall, on the high level analysis, there is no significant gender inequity among the Clinical Pharmacy faculty. In drilling down with the various tables, a slight imbalance (both in favor of female and male depending on the rank and series) in the $y$-factor is noted (Table 21.1). An important piece to keep in mind is that the sample sizes in some of the drill downs are very small (e.g., I currently have 3 adjunct faculty; 1 ladder rank faculty member and 3 in-residence). What the $y$-factor analysis reflects is that more recent hires in CP have a larger y -factor. This has been done in order to stay somewhat competitive with other entities (e.g., Kaiser, UCSF Medical Center) in order to recruit junior faculty. Another key factor that significantly plays into a faculty member's $y$ factor is their performance (e.g., ability to bring in extramural funding or provide significant service to the department in other ways such as committee work and teaching).
In reviewing the y-factors, (Table 29.1), for adjunct faculty, an imbalance for females is shown; this faculty member came to the Department from the School of Medicine-her y-factor has reduced over the years. For the HS clinical faculty, an imbalance for females is noted at the (which is a change from 2014, where there was an imbalance in men); this is reflective that of the 10 HS clinical faculty,

7 are female, with 2 new HS clinical faculty recruited since 2014. Drilling down by rank (Table 33), shows an imbalance toward men at the full rank in the HS Clinical series for the $y$-factor, which is due to 2 of the senior male HS faculty who are in leadership positions. At the Associate HS Clinical level ( 2 faculty -1 female and 1 male), there is an imbalance in the $y$-factor in favor of the female faculty member; this individual was hired for special contract work (Xerox/Medi-Cal DUR) and thus has a higher negotiated $y$-factor. For the Associate Clin X faculty, there is a slight male preference ( 0.76 ; total of 4 faculty; 1 female); this female faculty member's $y$-factor has been increased. For the Assistant Clin X faculty, there is a smaller male preference (0.92; 3 female
faculty and 1 male faculty who is a recent hire); 1 female faculty member's y-factor has been increase. Finally, in the research series (table 25), an imbalance for females is noted; this is a faculty member in the In Residence series who is a physician (who came to us from the School of Medicine), and therefore has a higher yfactor.

In reviewing the $z$-payments (tables 22 \& 23), there is an imbalance to women at the Associate level ( $\mathrm{n}=2$ female faculty members who are in a leadership position). In looking at the presence of zpayments by series (tables 30 \& 31), there is an imbalance to women. This reflects the female faculty in the department who hold leadership positions (Vice Chairs, Associate Deans, Vice Dean, Director of Experiential Education and Chair) and have administrative stipends.

For the presence of an acceleration (table 24), I believe there has only been 1 faculty member (a male) who was accelerated during the time period, and this is the reason for the male preference at the full professor level.

Based on my careful review of this analysis, I have made a few minor adjustments to faculty y-factors ( $\mathrm{n}=4$; 2 female and 2 male faculty) for FY16/17.

## DEPARTMENT OF PHARMACEUTICAL CHEMISTRY (PC)

Table 17. Unadjusted Median Salary X+Y (\$ 1,000s) by Gender Status

|  |  |  | July |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| PC | July 2016 | 2016 | July 2015 | 2015 |


| Gender | Median X+Y | $\mathbf{N}$ | Median $\mathbf{X + Y}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Female | 162 | 5 | 160 | 5 |
| Male | 175 | 19 | 174 | 19 |

Table 17.1 Unadjusted Median Salary Y (\$ 1,000s) by Gender Status
July July
$\begin{array}{lllll}\text { PC } & \text { July } 2016 & 2016 & \text { July } 2015 & 2015\end{array}$

| Gender | Median $\mathbf{Y}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ | Median $\mathbf{Y}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Female |  | 5 |  | 5 |
| Male | 36 | 19 | 37 | 19 |

Table 18. Unadjusted Presence of Z (Proportion) by Gender Status

|  |  | July |  | July |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| PC | July 2016 | 2016 | July 2015 | 2015 |


| Gender | Presence <br> of $\mathbf{Z}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ | Presence <br> of $\mathbf{Z}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Female | 0.2 | 5 | 0.4 | 5 |
| Male | 0.21 | 19 | 0.37 | 19 |

Table 19. Unadjusted Median Z Pay (\$ 1,000s), if Present by Gender Status

|  |  |  | July |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| PC | July 2016 | 2016 | July 2015 | 2015 |


| Gender | Median Z | N | Median Z | N |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Female | 10 | 1 | 7 | 2 |
| Male | 4 | 4 | 25 | 7 |

Table 20. Unadjusted Presence of Acceleration (Proportion) by Gender Status

|  |  | July |  | July |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| PC | July 2016 | 2016 | July 2015 | 2015 |


| Gender | Accel | $\mathbf{N}$ | Accel | $\mathbf{N}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Female | 0 | 10 | 0 | 10 |
| Male | 0.05 | 38 | 0.05 | 38 |

${ }^{*}$ Note: N represents two year's data for each faculty, thus is double the N of faculty for each analysis

Table 21. Unadjusted Median X+Y Pay (\$ 1,000s) and Pay Ratios by Gender by Rank

|  |  |  |  |  | $\mathbf{2 0 1 6}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 5}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| PC | 2016 <br> Female |  | 2016 <br> Male |  | Female/ <br> Male <br> Ratio | Female/ <br> Male |
| Rank | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | 0 | 0 |
| Assistant |  | 0 | 130 | 3 | 0 | 0.96 |
| Associate | 158 | 2 | 164 | 6 | 0.96 | 0.97 |
| Full | 162 | 3 | 247 | 10 | 0.66 | 0.66 |

Table 21.1 Unadjusted Median Y Pay (\$ 1,000s) and Pay Ratios by Gender by Rank

|  |  |  |  |  | $\mathbf{2 0 1 6}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 5}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| PC | 2016 <br> Female |  | 2016 <br> Male |  | Female/ <br> Male | Female/ <br> Male |
| Rank | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Ratio |  |
| Assistant |  | 0 | 35 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Associate | 26 | 2 | 43 | 6 | 0.6 | 0.6 |
| Full |  | 3 | 33 | 10 | 0 | 0 |

Table 22. Unadjusted Presence of $\mathbf{Z}$ (Proportion) and Ratios by Gender by Rank

|  | 2016 |  |  |  | $\mathbf{2 0 1 6}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 5}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| PC | Female |  | 2016 <br> Male |  | Female/ <br> Male | Female/ <br> Male |
| Rank | $\mathbf{Z}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ | $\mathbf{Z}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ | Ratio | Ratio |
| Assistant | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Associate | 0.5 | 2 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 1.75 |
| Full | 0 | 3 | 0.4 | 10 | 0 | 0.75 |

Table 23. Unadjusted Median Z (\$1,000s) and Pay Ratios, if Present, by Gender by Rank


Table 24. Unadjusted Presence of Acceleration and Ratios by Gender by Rank

|  | 2016 |  |  | 2016 | $\mathbf{2 0 1 5}$ |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| PC | 2016 |  | Female/ <br> Male | Female/ <br> Male |  |  |
| Rank | Accel | $\mathbf{N}$ | Accel | $\mathbf{N}$ | Ratio | Ratio |
| Assistant | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 |
| Associate | 0 | 4 | 0.08 | 12 | 0 | 0 |
| Full | 0 | 6 | 0.05 | 20 | 0 | 0 |

${ }^{*}$ Note: N represents two year's data for each faculty, thus is double the N of faculty for each analysis

Table 25. Unadjusted Median X+Y Pay (\$ 1,000s) and Pay Ratios by Gender by Doctorate Type

|  |  |  |  |  | $\mathbf{2 0 1 6}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 5}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| PC | 2016 <br> Female |  | 2016 <br> Male |  | Female/ <br> Male | Female/ <br> Male |
| Doctorate Type | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Ratio |  |
| None |  | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Research | 162 | 5 | 175 | 19 | 0.93 | 0.92 |
| Clinical |  | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Both |  | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Table 25.1 Unadjusted Median Y Pay (\$ 1,000s) and Pay Ratios by Gender by Doctorate Type

|  |  |  |  |  | 2016 | 2015 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2016 <br> PC |  | 2016 <br> Male |  | Female/ <br> Male | Female/ <br> Male |
| Doctorate Type | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Ratio |  |
| None |  | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Research |  | 5 | 36 | 19 | 0 | 0 |
| Clinical |  | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Both |  | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Table 26. Unadjusted Presence of $Z$ (Proportion) and Ratios by Gender by Doctorate Type


Table 27. Unadjusted Median Z Pay (\$1,000s) and Pay Ratios, if Present, by Gender by Doctorate Type

|  |  |  |  | 2016 | 2015 |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| PC | 2016 <br> Female |  | 2016 <br> Male |  | Female/ <br> Male | Female/ <br> Male <br> Ratio | Ratio |
| Doctorate Type | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Median | N | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| None |  | 0 |  | 4 | 2.86 | 0.28 |  |
| Research | 10 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |
| Clinical | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 |  |  |
| Both |  | 0 |  |  | 0 |  |  |

Table 28. Unadjusted Presence of Acceleration (Proportion) and Pay Ratios by Gender by Doctorate Type


[^0]Table 29. Unadjusted Median X+Y Pay (\$ 1,000s) and Pay Ratios by Gender by Series

|  |  |  |  | 2016 | 2015 |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| PC | 2016 <br> Female |  | 2016 <br> Male |  | Female/ <br> Male | Female/ <br> Male <br> Reries | Median |
| Adjunct | 151 | $\mathbf{N}$ | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Ratio | Ratio |  |
| Clinical X |  | 0 | 151 | 1 | 1 | 1 |  |
| HS Clinical |  | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |
| In Residence | 174 | 1 | 161 | 5 | 1.08 | 1.1 |  |
| Ladder Rank | 162 | 3 | 202 | 13 | 0.8 | 0.79 |  |

Table 29.1 Unadjusted Median Y Pay (\$ 1,000s) and Pay Ratios by Gender by Series

|  | 2016 <br> PC |  |  | 2016 | 2015 |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Series | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Median | $\mathbf{N}$ | Female/ <br> Male <br> Male | Female/ <br> Male <br> Ratio |
| Adjunct |  | 1 |  | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Clinical X |  | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| HS Clinical |  | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| In Residence | 51 | 1 | 35 | 5 | 1.46 | 1.46 |
| Ladder Rank |  | 3 | 39 | 13 | 0 | 0 |

Table 30. Unadjusted Presence of Z (Proportion) and Ratios by Gender by Series

|  | 2016 <br>  <br> PC |  | 2016 <br> Male |  | 2016 | Female/ Male | Female/ Male |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Series | $\mathbf{Z}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ | $\mathbf{Z}$ | $\mathbf{N}$ | Ratio | Ratio |  |
| Adjunct | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |  |
| Clinical X | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |
| HS Clinical | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |
| In Residence | 0 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 |  |
| Ladder Rank | 0.33 | 3 | 0.31 | 13 | 1.08 | 1.73 |  |

Table 31. Unadjusted Median Z Pay (\$ 1,000s) and Pay Ratios, if Present, by Gender by Series


Table 32. Unadjusted Presence of Acceleration (Proportion) and Ratios by Gender by Series

|  |  |  |  | 2016 | 2015 |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| PC | 2016 <br> Female |  | 2016 <br> Male |  | Female/ <br> Male <br> Female/ <br> Male |  |
| Series | Accel | N | Accel | N | Ratio | Ratio |
| Adjunct | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Clinical X | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| HS Clinical | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| In Residence | 0 | 2 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 0 |
| Ladder Rank | 0 | 6 | 0.08 | 26 | 0 | 0 |

[^1]Table 33 (PC). Unadjusted Median Pay (\$1,000s) and Pay Ratios by Gender by Series and Rank

| Pharmaceutical Chemistry (PC) | 2016 Female |  |  |  | 2016 Male |  |  |  | 2016 <br> Female/Male Ratio |  | ```2015 Female/Male Ratio``` |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { Series } \\ \hline \text { Rank } \\ \hline \end{array}$ | Median $X+Y$ | Median $\mathbf{Y}$ | N | Average Years Since Doctorate | Median $X+Y$ | Median $\mathbf{Y}$ | N | Average Years Since Doctorate | X+Y | Y | X+Y | Y |
| Adjunct |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Assistant |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | 0 |  |  |  | 0 |  |
| Associate |  |  | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Full | 151 |  | 1 | 30 | 151 |  | 1 | 27 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Clinical X |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Assistant |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Associate |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Full |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| HS Clinical |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Assistant |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Associate |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Full |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| In Residence |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Assistant |  |  |  |  | 130 | 25 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 0 |  |  |
| Associate | 174 | 51 | 1 | 19 | 161 | 36 | 3 | 15.33 | 1.08 | 1.44 | 1.08 | 1.2 |
| Full |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ladder Rank |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Assistant |  |  |  |  | 157 | 41 | 1 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Associate | 141 |  | 1 | 21 | 166 | 43 | 3 | 12 | 0.85 | 0 | 0.85 | 0 |
| Full | 176 | 19 | 2 | 29.5 | 258 | 34 | 9 | 30.78 | 0.68 | 0.57 | 0.7 | 0.61 |

## 2015 Department of Pharmaceutical Chemistry (PC) Explanation:

## Inequity in Y Factor by Gender

The salary equity analysis shows inequity in the unadjusted Median Y Salary in the department of Pharmaceutical Chemistry. In the Full Professor Level of the Ladder Rank Series, male faculty members have higher combined pay than female faculty members. Contrary to the Adjunct Series, female faculty has a higher combined pay and $Y$ Factor than male Adjunct faculty. By examining across rank by series, the Female/Male Ratio for unadjusted median $\mathrm{X}+\mathrm{Y}$ pay and pay ratios by gender and series (Table 29) is 1.07 in the Adjunct Series and 0.61 in for Ladder Rank faculty. Table 33 "Unadjusted Median X+Y Pay and Pay Ratio by Gender by Series, Rank" shows the Female to Male

Ratio of 0.55 for Full Professor, Ladder Rank. The disparity is further shown in the data Table 29.1 "Unadjusted Median Y Pay and Pay Ratios by Gender by Series" in which Female/Male Ratio of the Ladder Rank series is 0.17 .

The underlying reason for the disparity in " $Y$ " between male and female faculty in the department is a corresponding disparity in the sponsored research (grant) revenue between male and female faculty in the department. The negotiated salary is not guaranteed to any faculty and the funding source is nearly solely supported by the faculty member's own research grants. The ability to meet the department's compensation plan (comp plan) goal is the key factor in salary level setting. The individual goal for each faculty member varies by rank and series (Appendix A). Revenue calculation is based on the effort level each Principal Investigator (PI) contributes across his or her federal, nonfederal and department funding sources. Pls who do not meet his or her comp plan goal over a period of time are reduced to base salary at the scale of the comp plan. In FY14, 16 faculty members of all ranks and series participated in the Pharmaceutical Chemistry compensation plan. 10 out of 16 members met the TDC goal of all gender and rank, and it was female members for 1 out of 3 (Appendix B).

## 2016 Department of Pharmaceutical Chemistry (PC) Explanation:

Changes from the 2015 report are minor.
The departmental compensation policy remains unaltered and applies to all in-residence and ladderrank faculty with primary appointments in the department; faculty are provided with updates during the fiscal year so that they are aware whether they are on track to meet the requirements of the compensation plan. Currently, all primary faculty are considered to be in compliance. Faculty with primary appointments in other departments, ORUs, or the Gladstone are subject to the compensation plans of those units. Notably, the Institute for Neurodegenerative Diseases uses different APUs than the School of Pharmacy; this is reflected in the compensation of 2 (white male) faculty members.

A primary aspect of the compensation plan, as for all of the basic science departments, is that Yfactors must be supported by appropriate research grants, most commonly from the NIH (starting assistant professors are partially exempt from this requirement, as detailed in their offer letters and in accordance with the compensation plan). In the currently challenging funding environment, levels of grant support vary markedly between faculty members, with a few unable to support any Y . On the other hand, being very well funded does not, in itself, justify arbitrarily high Y-factors. The chair has adopted the following guidelines for yearly negotiations with faculty to set total salary:

| Rank | (Total X+Y salary)/(Scale 0 X salary) |
| :--- | :---: |
| Assistant | $1.7-1.9$ |
| Associate | $1.6-1.8$ |
| Full (steps 1-5) | $1.5-1.7$ |
| Full (steps 6-above scale) | $1.4-1.6$ |

Note that these ratios decrease with increasing rank, such that Y -payments, in absolute dollar terms, do not increase dramatically with increasing rank. The median $Y$-factor thus remains approximately the same, in absolute dollars, between associate and full professors, for example. These ranges are not currently incorporated into the compensation plan and are thus guidelines, not policy. However, 3 faculty above the upper limits of these ranges have been notified that their salaries will come into compliance with these ranges as they receive merit increases that will increase their $X$ compensation, without corresponding increases in Y compensation. The lower end of the ranges only applies when faculty have sufficient grant support to enable them to receive $Y$ payments.

The data concerning $\mathrm{X}+\mathrm{Y}$ pay ratios by gender are fully explained by equitable application of the compensation plan, and specifically the low levels of sponsored research obtained by a small number of faculty. In cases where faculty were hired at the same time, and with similar responsibilities (a pair of full professors, 1 male and 1 female; and a pair of associate in residence professors, 1 male and 1 female), the $X$ and $Y$ pay are identical.

Modest Z payments from the Department and School of Pharmacy are provided to faculty who have significant administrative responsibilities, specifically those who serve as Chairs, Vice Chairs, Vice Deans, or Director of a PhD graduate program. Any other Z payments arise from consulting or other similar "outside professional activities", as governed by various UC policies.

Note: Appendix A \& B were provided with the 2015 explanation from PC.
Appendix A - Total Department Contribution (TDC) Target Goal by Rank and Series

| Professor |  | 1.25 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Associate Professor |  | 1.15 |
| Assistant Professor Step 5 |  | 0.50 |
| In Residence | 0.95 |  |

## Appendix B - Faculty Salary Support by C\&G Funding by Gender, By Rank, By Series

- In FY 14, the average ladder rank faculty effort paid from sponsored research was $35 \%$. Adjunct has to fund $100 \%$ by C\&G.
- Breakdown by rank for ladder rank faculty:
- Full - 45\% (49\% Male, 17\% Female); Male > Female
- Associate - $12 \%$ ( $21 \%$ Male, $3 \%$ Female); Male > Female

Appendix C: School of Pharmacy Report and Action Plan
Faculty Salary Equity Review Committee Report 2017

○ Assistant - 42\% (42\% Male, N/A Female),

- Adjunct 100\% (100\% Male, 100\% Female)
- Average number of contracts and grants of faculty by rank by gender by series:
- Full - 6 (Male 6.3; Female 4) Male $>$ Female
- Associate - 1.5 (Male 2, Female 1) Male $>$ Female
- Assistant - 4.3 (Male 4.3, Female N/A)
- Adjunct - 10.33 (Male 10, Female 15) Male < Female


## Other data points for background reference

- A female was promoted from Adjunct Series to In-Residence Series in January 2014. A male was promoted at the same time. They are both Associate Directors to the SMDC with the same level of authority. They are paid at the exact same level, both with a large " Y " factor.
- Pharm Chem has recruited 2 Full Ladder Rank Professors in 2014. A female and a male who are paid at the exact same level with a large " $Y$ " factor.
- Assistant Professors, a male and a female who were recruited to UCSF at the same time, have salaries set at the same level.
- Recruitments in the department are often done jointly with another department or organized research unit (ORU) in which the salary negotiation is not completely under the department's control. However, equity and parity between School of Medicine and School of Pharmacy and between departments are always kept in consideration.
- A new female Adjunct Full Professor is joining Pharm Chem in July 2015.
- "Z" factors are given to Chairs, Vice Dean, and Vice Chairs department and school-wide administrative responsibilities.


## Appendix D: FSER Report- School of Medicine

Faculty Salary Equity Study<br>School of Medicine<br>March 2017

In July 2016 Vice Provost Brian Alldredge distributed the results of the UCSF Faculty Salary Equity Review for FY16. The School of Medicine's Analytic Team (Vice Dean Elena Fuentes-Afflick, Vice Dean Maye Chrisman, and Professor Nancy Hessol from the School of Pharmacy) analyzed the data, identified several data discrepancies, and created a new dataset in October 2016.

## OVERALL SCHOOL OF MEDICINE ANALYSIS

$\mathrm{X}+\mathrm{Y}$ compensation -- The results for the School of Medicine demonstrated that female faculty members received $X+Y$ compensation that was $3-5 \%$ lower than their male counterparts, depending on rank. Specifically, the $\mathrm{X}+\mathrm{Y}$ salary for female faculty members by rank revealed:

- Assistant Professors: 3\% lower than males;
- Associate Professors: 5\% lower than males;
- Professors: $4 \%$ lower than males

There was no difference in $\mathrm{X}+\mathrm{Y}$ compensation related to URM status.
Z payment -- There were no gender- or URM-based differences in the likelihood of receiving a $Z$ payment (clinical incentive payment).

However, among faculty who received a Z payment, female faculty members received less by rank:

- Assistant Professors: females received $27 \%$ less than their male counterparts;
- Associate Professors: no significant gender-based difference;
- Professors: females received $33 \%$ less than their male counterparts

Summary Statement -- For the School of Medicine, the Faculty Salary Equity Study continues to be an effective means of analyzing compensation issues and identifying areas of concern. Departmental leaders were actively engaged in the review process and committed to the goal of identifying and addressing imbalances. The Dean's Office encouraged all departments to be transparent about compensation issues and will continue to support departmental leaders in our collective efforts to promote equity across gender and URM groups.

## INDIVIDUAL DEPARTMENTAL ANALYSES

The School's Analytic Team conducted a parallel set of analyses for each department. The Chair and Manager were asked to review the findings, encouraged to further analyze the dataset, and to propose solutions in case of a gender- or URM-based difference. In September 2016 the Analytic Team hosted a workshop for department managers to review the findings and to assist with the interpretation of the findings.

- Overall, we identified statistically significant differences in $\mathrm{X}+\mathrm{Y}$ compensation according to gender or URM status within six departments.
- We did not identify statistically significant differences in the likelihood of receiving a $Z$ payment according to gender or URM status in any department.
- Each department provided a thoughtful analysis of the way in which salaries are determined and emphasized their commitment to ongoing review of compensation in order to minimize the risk of gender- or URM-based differences in compensation.
- Each department's findings and analysis have been or will be shared more broadly with their department constituents.

This summary details the responses from each department that demonstrated a significant difference. The FSER committee reviewed detailed analyses for each department; a summary version of the analyses is presented in this report.

## Epidemiology and Biostatistics

FINDING: In the Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics female faculty members received $\mathrm{X}+\mathrm{Y}$ compensation that was $15 \%$ lower than their male colleagues.

Additional analyses: The department undertook additional analyses and noted that their compensation plan explicitly benefits faculty who have clinical or combined clinical-research degrees. After adjusting for the differentiation between clinical and non-clinical faculty, as well as rank and step, there was no longer a significant gender difference in compensation.

Outcome: The department noted that the three highest paid faculty members are men whose salaries are set outside the departmental compensation structure because of their campus- or school-level leadership roles. After removing these faculty members from the departmental dataset and adjusting for type of degree, there was no longer a gender-based difference in $\mathrm{X}+\mathrm{Y}$ compensation. The departmental report also commented on the way that the chair's discretionary funds are used, since this mechanism could introduce inequities in faculty compensation.

Dean's Office Decision: We accept the department's revised analysis and agree that adjusting for type of degree and academic rank/step eliminated the gender-based difference in $X+Y$ compensation.

We encourage the department to consider alternative ways of supporting faculty salaries in times of financial duress.

No further action is required.

## Family and Community Medicine

FINDING: In the Department of Family and Community Medicine URM faculty members received $X+Y$ compensation that was $11 \%$ higher than non-URM faculty.

Additional analyses: Dr. Kevin Grumbach, Department Chair, provided contextual information and additional data, including matched pair analysis, to explain the statistically significant URM-based differences in $\mathrm{X}+\mathrm{Y}$ compensation and highlighted the Y -factor table in the department's compensation plan.

Outcome: In the matched pair analysis and contextual explanation, the differences in $\mathrm{X}+\mathrm{Y}$ compensation by URM status were explained by leadership roles or compelling business reasons.

Dean's Office Decision: We accept the department's explanation that there are leadership or business reasons which explain the observed differences in $X+Y$ compensation according to URM status.

No further action is required.

## Medicine

FINDING: In the Department of Medicine female faculty members received $X+Y$ compensation that was $8 \%$ lower than their male counterparts.

Additional analyses:
The department submitted additional analyses which focused on PhD faculty members ( $\mathrm{n}=78$ ). Using logistic regression analysis of $\mathrm{X}+\mathrm{Y}$ compensation and adjusting for academic series, K award status, rank, and site, there was no statistically significant difference in compensation by gender ( $P=0.847$ ) or URM status ( $P=0.299$ ).

The department submitted additional analyses which focused on MD faculty members ( $\mathrm{n}=455$ ). Using logistic regression analysis of $\mathrm{X}+\mathrm{Y}$ compensation and adjusting for academic series, K award status, rank, site, specialty, and leadership roles, there was no statistically significant difference by gender ( $P=0.099$ ) or URM status ( $P=0.887$ ).

Outcome: In the revised, more comprehensive analyses for MD and PhD faculty, there were no statistically significant differences in $\mathrm{X}+\mathrm{Y}$ compensation by gender or URM status.

Dean's Office Decision: We appreciate the department's analysis and endorse the finding that there was no gender- or URM-based difference in $X+Y$ compensation for MD or PhD faculty. The analytic scope that was undertaken by the department exceeded the capacity of the dataset that we received for the schoolwide analyses.

No further action is required.

## Obstetrics, Gynecology and Reproductive Sciences

FINDING: In the Department of Obstetrics, Gynecology and Reproductive Sciences URM faculty received $X+Y$ compensation that was $25 \%$ lower than non-URM faculty members.

Additional analyses: The department submitted detailed analyses of all faculty and highlighted the salary comparisons between URM and non-URM faculty. Three of the eight URM faculty members in the department are Certified Nurse Midwives, who are compensated at a lower rate than physicians.

Outcome: When comparing non-midwife, URM faculty to non-midwife, non-URM faculty, there was no evidence of a URM-based difference in compensation.

Dean's Office Decision: We accept the department's analysis and agree that there is no evidence of a URM-based imbalance in compensation once the appropriate comparison was defined.

No further action is required.

## Pediatrics

FINDING: In the Department of Pediatrics female faculty members received $X+Y$ compensation that was $10 \%$ lower than their male counterparts, and URM faculty members received $X+Y$ compensation that was $11 \%$ lower than their non-URM counterparts.

Additional analyses: The department noted that four highly-paid faculty members have salaries set outside the departmental compensation structure because of their campus- or health system-level leadership roles. The department excluded these faculty members and adjusted for subspecialty designation in the statistical model.

Outcome: After these adjustments there was no evidence of a gender- or URM-based imbalance in $\mathrm{X}+\mathrm{Y}$ compensation.

Dean's Office Decision: We accept the department's analysis and agree that there is no evidence of a gender- or URM-based imbalance in compensation once the appropriate variables were analyzed.

No further action is required.

## Surgery

FINDING: In the Department of Surgery, female faculty members received $X+Y$ compensation that was 17\% lower than their male counterparts.

Additional analyses: The department analyzed the dataset and added information about wRVU's, geography (East Bay versus UCSF campus), and type of scientific work (basic versus clinical). The department focused on the Y component of salary since the X component is fixed and is not subject to change or negotiation.

Outcome:
wRVU: The department reported that female faculty members earn fewer wRVU's than males (4677 versus $6200, P=0.006$ ). In a multivariate analysis which included gender, URM status, series, rank, and wRVU's, there was no longer a statistically significant gender-based difference in $Y$ compensation.

Dr. Roberts explained that faculty members in each division meet with their divisional leaders every year to review their clinical activity and ensure equitable access to patient care activities such as clinic time, call schedule and operating room time.

Geography: The East Bay Surgery faculty are paid on a contractual basis and do not accrue wRVU's so they were removed from the analyses of $Y$ compensation. The department compared $Y$ compensation by gender among the six East Bay faculty members (one woman, five men) and found no significant gender difference ( $P=0.24$ ).

Type of scientific work: The basic science faculty members do not accrue wRVU's; when the department compared $Y$ compensation between female ( $n=12$ ) and male $(n=12)$ basic science faculty members, there was no significant gender-based difference ( $P=0.31$ ).

Dean's Office Decision: We accept the department's analysis and agree that there is no evidence of a gender-based difference in compensation once the appropriate comparisons were made.

No further action is required.

## Appendix E: FSER Report- School of Dentistry

UCSF School of Dentistry Faculty Salary Equity Review, 2016-2017

## Introduction

Following the 2015 Faculty Salary Equity Review, Chancellor Hawgood reconvened the Faculty Salary Equity Review (FSER) Committee to review the action plans submitted by the four schools. The 2015 report was submitted to the Chancellor in January 2016. The school of Dentistry committed to investigate the possibility of gender and race salary imbalances on an annual basis.

## Conclusions and Action Plans

- The School of Dentistry will continue to endeavor to attract and develop faculty from an under represented minority (URM) background, and in addition will continue to provide training for and to promote an inclusive environment in all units.
- Department Chairs will be directed to utilize the existing and developing resources for all Searches.
- The assignment of existing faculty to programs and clinical units that have the potential to result in an increase in $Z$ or $Y$ payments should be very carefully considered and reviewed on an annual basis for gender and URM status disparity.
- The Department Chairs will ensure that all faculty have the same opportunities to engage in income generating practices, and also that mentoring and teaching are assigned equitably.

In the 2016-2017 School of Dentistry Faculty Salary Equity Review, the following parameters were reviewed:

The variables measured:

- Base salary (X)
- $\quad$ Negotiated salary (Y)
- $\quad$ Salary from clinical incentives ( $Z$ )
- Accelerated academic advancements

The covariates:

- Series
- Rank
- Step
- Doctorate type
- Department

Comparisons made between:

- URM vs Non-URM status
- Gender


## Methods for the UCSF School of Dentistry Analysis

## URM Vs Non-URM

The School of Dentistry analysis used the same raw data used to produce the 2015 campus report.
Table 1

|  | Total <br> Number | Assistant | Associate | Full | Accelerations | Z Factor <br> Presence |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| URM | 5 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Non URM | 67 | 14 | 17 | 36 | 2 | 7 |
| Total | 72 | 16 | 17 | 39 | 2 | 7 |

Table 1: Under represented minority (URM) and non-URM demographics by rank and presence of acceleration and $Z$ factor

## Female Vs Male

Table 2:

|  | Total <br> Number | Assistant | Associate | Full | Accelerations | Z Factor <br> Presence |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Female | 31 | 7 | 12 | 12 | 1 | 1 |
| Male | 40 | 9 | 5 | 26 | 1 | 6 |
| Total | 71 | 16 | 17 | 38 | 2 | 7 |

Table 2: Gender demographics by rank and presence of acceleration and Z factor.
The School's analysis used multiple regression to account for fundamental differences between faculty before making female vs male comparisons. Three variables were studied:

- $\quad$ Total salary $(X+Y)$
- $\quad$ Presence and amount of salary from clinical incentives $(Z)$
- Frequency of accelerated academic advancements

Potential covariates used in the regression analysis were:

- Series
- Rank
- Step
- Doctorate type
- Department

A matched pair analysis was performed for presence of $Z$ payments, presence of acceleration and total $X$ + Y payments by gender and URM status.

## Results

## Under Represented Minority Faculty

There was inadequate data available for statistical analyses for presence of $Z$, acceleration and total salary $(X+Y)$. A match pair analysis was performed for $X+Y$ and $Z$ payments based on rank, step, department, degree type and series. Differences in the amounts in each of these were found to be due to differences in roles and were explained by legitimate business practices. Because of the small number of URM faculty in the School of Dentistry, the detailed analysis has been removed to ensure privacy.

## Gender

## Female/Male (X+Y) Pay Ratio

Table 3 shows unadjusted, partially adjusted (for rank, step, and department) and fully adjusted (for series and degree type) results for median salary ( $\mathrm{X}+\mathrm{Y}$ ).

Table 3

| Adjustment | Ratio | 95\% Confidence <br> Interval |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Unadjusted | 0.856 | $(0.737,0.999)$ |
| Partially Adjusted | 0.905 | $(0.797,1.028)$ |
| Fully Adjusted | 0.911 | $(0.796,1.043)$ |

Table 3: Partially adjusted included rank, step and department; fully adjusted added series and degree type.

The analysis summarized in Table 1 shows that $X+Y$ pay, when partially adjusted or fully adjusted, was not statistically significantly different between females and males.

Residual analysis for total salary $(X+Y)$ by Gender
Further analysis was completed in order to look at the trends in Female and Male salaries, despite there being no statistically significant differences between them. A matched pair analysis was used to generate expected amounts for faculty salaries, based on the assignment to Department, rank, step, degree type and series. These values were compared to the actual faculty salaries to see if there were faculty who earned either much more or much less than these amounts. This created residuals, which were then standardized to Z-scores by dividing by their standard error. This allows identification of "unusual" salaries, either much greater than, or much less than, anticipated (between -1.5 and +1.5 standard errors). Department Chairs were contacted for each individual who received a greater than or lesser than anticipated salary and explanations were provided. Most of the differences were related to clinical practice and the generation of income. Some faculty had a dental license and elected not to practice; others had more than one day per week assigned to clinical practice and generated more income. The opportunity to practice more than one day per week is offered to all faculty in Departments. A few of the differences were as a result of administrative stipends (Department Chairs, Associate Deans and program directors) and even fewer were due to successful grant funding. Two of the programs generated additional income for the male, non-URM program directors, and this raised questions as to how the directors had been assigned to these programs. A review of the search and hiring process found the assignments not to be discriminatory.

## Presence of salary from clinical incentives $(Z)$ by gender

Table 5 shows unadjusted, partially adjusted and fully adjusted comparison of the proportion of females and males receiving a $Z$ payment.

Table 5

| Adjustment | Ratio | 95\% Confidence Interval |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Unadjusted | 0.215 | $(0.027,1.652)$ |
| Partially Adjusted | 0.028 | $(0.004,0.209)$ |
| Fully Adjusted |  |  |

Table 5: Partially adjusted included rank, step and department; fully adjusted models adding series and degree type do not fit.

The analysis summarized in Table 5 shows there are no significant differences between the proportion of females and males that receive $Z$ payments in unadjusted and partially adjusted data. Full adjustment was not possible for our data set, since the sample size was not large enough to allow that many adjustment parameters.

Match Pair analysis for Female: Male presence of $Z$ factor, by Department
As with the $X+Y$ salary, the presence of $Z$ factors was related to the generation of clinical income from practice.

## Frequency of accelerated academic advancements

It was not possible to perform a statistical analysis on the Female/Male incidence of acceleration ratio, due to the lack of data.

## Summary of UCSF School of Dentistry Results

- There were too few URM faculty for there to be a statistical comparison of URM vs Non-URM salary and accelerated actions. A match pair analysis resulted in very few matches. Where there were differences in salary, these were all found to be as a result of the different roles in which the faculty engaged. (Those faculty generating different incomes were primarily due to engagement, or not, in clinical practice, as well as $Y$ components generated as a result of administrative work and successful grant writing).
- There were more males than females in the School of Dentistry, with men dominating the Full Professor titles, and women being more prevalent in the Associate level positions.
- After accounting for rank, department, rank, step, series and degree type and comparing faculty who are in similar roles, there is no statistically significant gender difference in Z payments or $\mathrm{X}+$ Y payments to women and men.
- The process of assignment of faculty to programs that have the potential to generate income is not discriminatory with regard to gender or URM status.
- Although the differences do not have statistical significance, there is an overall pattern of men generating a greater $Z$ and $X+Y$ than women.


## Discussion

URM:
There is concern that there are few URM faculty with full time positions in the School of Dentistry. The Dean created a new role, Associate Dean for Diversity and Inclusion (ADDI) in 2015, and there have been a number of outreach events on a National basis to encourage faculty with a URM background to apply to open positions. The challenges are that the lack of URM faculty in Dentistry is a Nationwide issue (at about $13 \%$ ); Attracting junior faculty into the San Francisco Bay area presents a fiscal problem, with Junior faculty salaries not supporting the cost of living and loan repayments. The ADDI provides in-person training for faculty and staff in best practices for diversity and inclusion, as well as unconscious bias training, which is mandatory for those faculty engaged in a search process. The ADDI is also very active at the student level, in consideration of a pipeline, providing funding for attendance at National meetings, particularly those that encourage a future in academia.

Gender:
The pattern of salary imbalance by gender in the School of Dentistry does not have an obvious discriminatory cause. Department Chairs were questioned in detail as to how each of the faculty generated their additional $Z$ or $Y$ payments. Faculty who were hired as program directors of programs that could potentially generate additional income were hired in a non-discriminatory process. In table 4, it was noted that four male faculty received less total $X+Y$ than anticipated, which was not true for any female faculty. The reasons for the lower total $X+Y$ amounts seemed to have a legitimate business basis, mostly related to the presence, or absence of, income generated from clinical practice. All faculty have an equal opportunity to engage in clinical practice. It is not known how much time each faculty member spends in teaching, mentoring and other service related activities that are important to the mission of UCSF and it is not known if those faculty who generate less income are engaged at a higher level in these activities.

## Conclusions and Action Plans

- The School of Dentistry will continue to endeavor to attract and develop faculty from a URM background, and in addition will continue to provide training for and to promote an inclusive environment in all units.
- Department Chairs will continue to use unconscious bias training for all Searches.
- The assignment of existing faculty to programs and clinical units that have the potential to result in an increase in $Z$ or $Y$ payments should be very carefully considered and reviewed on an annual basis for gender and URM status disparity by the Department Chairs.
- The Department Chairs will ensure that all faculty have the same opportunities to engage in income generating practices, and also that mentoring and teaching are assigned equitably.


## - Appendix A

Table numbering matches that of the campus report.
Table 17: Unadjusted Median Salary $\mathrm{X}+\mathrm{Y}(\$ 1,000 \mathrm{~s})$, by Gender Status

| Female <br> Median <br> $(X+Y)$ 1000s | Female <br> sample <br> size | Male <br> Median <br> $(\mathbf{X}+\mathbf{Y})$ <br> 1000 | Male <br> sample <br> size | Female/Male <br> Ratio of <br> Median $(X+Y)$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 160 | 31 | 195 | 40 | 0.82 |

Table 18: Unadjusted Presence of $Z$ (Proportion) by Gender Status

| Female <br> Presence <br> of Z | Female <br> sample size | Male <br> Presence of <br> $\mathbf{Z}$ | Male <br> sample size | Female/Male <br> Ratio of <br> Presence of $\mathbf{Z}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| .03 | 31 | .15 | 40 | 0.21 |

Table 19: Unadjusted Median Z Pay, if present, (\$1000s) by Gender Status

| Female <br> Median Z <br> 1000s | Female $\mathbf{Z}$ <br> pay sample <br> size | Male <br> Median $\mathbf{Z}$ <br> 1000s | Male Z pay <br> sample <br> size | Female/Male <br> Ratio of <br> Median $\mathbf{Z}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 41 | 1 | 18 | 6 | 2.26 |

Table 21: Unadjusted Median $\mathrm{X}+\mathrm{Y}(\$ 1000$ s) Pay and Pay Ratios by Gender by Rank

| Rank | Female <br> Median <br> $\mathbf{( \mathbf { X } + \mathbf { Y } )}$ <br> $\mathbf{1 0 0 0}$ | Female <br> sample <br> size | Male <br> Median <br> $\mathbf{( \mathbf { X } + \mathbf { Y } )}$ <br> $\mathbf{1 0 0 0}$ | Male <br> sample <br> size | Female/Male <br> Ratio of <br> Median $(\mathbf{X}+\mathbf{Y})$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Assistant | 150 | 7 | 150 | 9 | 0.99 |
| Associate | 148 | 12 | 185 | 5 | 0.80 |
| Full | 196 | 12 | 207 | 26 | 0.94 |

Table 22: Unadjusted Presence of Z (Proportion) and Ratios by Gender by Rank

| Rank | Female <br> Presence of $\mathbf{Z}$ | Female <br> sample size | Male <br> Presence of <br> $\mathbf{Z}$ | Male <br> sample <br> size | Female/Male Ratio of <br> Presence of $\mathbf{Z}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Assistant | 0.14 | 7 | 0.11 | 9 | 1.29 |
| Associate | 0.00 | 12 | 0.40 | 5 | 0.00 |
| Full | 0.00 | 12 | 0.12 | 26 | 0.00 |

Table 23: Unadjusted Median Z (\$1000s) and pay ratios, if Present, by Gender by Rank

| Rank | Female <br> Median Z <br> 1000s | Female Z pay <br> sample size | Male Median <br> Z 1000s | Male Z pay <br> sample size | Female/Male Ratio <br> of Median Z |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Assistant | 41 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 8 |
| Associate |  |  | 18 | 2 |  |
| Full |  |  | 38 | 3 |  |

Table 24: Unadjusted Presence of Acceleration (Proportion) and Ratios by Gender by Rank

| Rank | Female Accel | Female N | Male Accel | Male N | Female/Male Ratio |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Assistant | 0.00 | 7 | 0.00 | 9 |  |
| Associate | 0.08 | 12 | 0.00 | 5 |  |
| Full | 0.00 | 12 | 0.04 | 26 | 0.00 |
| Unadjusted |  |  |  |  |  |

Table 25: Unadjusted Median X + Y (\$1000s) Pay and Pay Ratios by Gender by Doctorate Type

|  | Female <br> Median <br> $\mathbf{( X + Y )}$ | Male <br> Female <br> sample <br> size | Median <br> $\mathbf{( \mathbf { X } + \mathbf { Y } )}$ <br> $\mathbf{1 0 0 0}$ | Male <br> sampI <br> e size | Female/Male <br> Ratio of <br> Median <br> $(\mathbf{X}+\mathbf{Y})$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Degree Type | $\mathbf{1 0 0 0}$ |  |  |  |  |

Table 26: Unadjusted Presence of Z (Proportion) and Ratios by Gender by Doctorate Type

| Degree Type | Female <br> Presence <br> of $\boldsymbol{Z}$ | Femal <br> $\mathbf{e}$ <br> sampl <br> e size | Male <br> Presence <br> of $\boldsymbol{Z}$ | Male <br> sample <br> size | Female/Male <br> Ratio of <br> Presence of $\boldsymbol{Z}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Both | 0.00 | 7 | 0.14 | 14 | 0.00 |
| Clinical | 0.08 | 12 | 0.25 | 16 | 0.33 |
| Research | 0.00 | 12 | 0.00 | 10 |  |

Table 27: Unadjusted Median Pay ( $\$ 1,000$ s) and Pay Ratios, if Present, by Gender by Doctorate Type

| Degree | Female <br> Median <br> Z 1000s | Female <br> Z pay <br> sample <br> size | Male <br> Median <br> Z 1000s | Male Z <br> pay <br> sampI <br> e size | Female/Male Ratio <br> of Median Z |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Type |  |  | 35 | 2 |  |
| Both |  |  |  |  |  |
| Clinical |  |  | 18 | 4 | 2.26 |

Table 29: Unadjusted Median $X+Y(\$ 1,000$ s) Pay and Pay Ratios by Gender by Series

|  | Female <br> Median <br> $(\mathbf{X}+\mathbf{Y})$ <br> $\mathbf{1 0 0 0 s}$ | Female <br> sample <br> size | Male <br> Median <br> $\mathbf{( \mathbf { X } + \mathbf { Y } )}$ <br> $\mathbf{1 0 0 0}$ | Male <br> sample <br> size | Female/Male <br> Ratio of <br> Median <br> $(\mathbf{X + Y})$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Series | 143 | 2 | 134 | 4 | 1.06 |
| Cljunct | 170 | 3 | 195 | 3 | 0.87 |
| ClinicalX | 150 | 11 | 207 | 14 | 0.72 |
| InResidence | 185 | 2 | 140 | 1 | 1.32 |
| LadderRank | 164 | 13 | 209 | 18 | 0.78 |

Table 30: Unadjusted Presence of Z (Proportion) and Ratios by Gender by Series

| Series | Female <br> Presence <br> of Z | Female <br> sample <br> size | Male <br> Presenc <br> e of $\mathbf{Z}$ | Male <br> sample <br> size | Female/Male <br> Ratio of <br> Presence of <br> $\mathbf{Z}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Adjunct | 0.00 | 2 | 0.00 | 4 |  |
| ClinicalX | 0.00 | 3 | 0.33 | 3 | 0.00 |
| HSClinical | 0.09 | 11 | 0.21 | 14 | 0.42 |
| InResidence | 0.00 | 2 | 0.00 | 1 |  |
| LadderRank | 0.00 | 13 | 0.11 | 18 | 0.00 |

Table 31: Unadjusted Median Z Pay ( $\$ 1,000$ s) and Pay Ratios, if present, by Gender by Series

|  | Female <br> Median Z <br> $\mathbf{1 0 0 0}$ | Female <br> Z pay <br> sample <br> size | Male <br> Median <br> Z 100s | Male Z pay <br> sample <br> size | Female/Male <br> Ratio of Median <br> Z |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Series |  |  |  |  |  |
| Adjunct |  |  | 24 | 1 |  |
| ClinicalX | 41 | 1 | 10 | 3 | 4 |
| HSClinical | 410 |  |  |  |  |
| InResidence |  |  | 52 | 2 |  |
| LadderRank |  |  | 52 |  |  |


[^0]:    *Note: N represents two year's data for each faculty, thus is double the N of faculty for each analysis

[^1]:    *Note: N represents two year's data for each faculty, thus is double the N of faculty for each analysis

